The moral realist says āBut surely moral facts exist, because it seems that, all else equal, a world where everyone gets tortured is worse than a world full of flourishing.ā In reply, the moral anti-realist might say something like āSure, we can agree about that. But it seems to me that you think you are also saying that for every moral question, thereās a single correct answer. ā¦
I find myself quite confused now. This passage sounds to me like itās implying that the anti-realist position is: āSome moral claims may be objectively true, but many are neither objectively true nor objectively false.ā In this case, it sounds like the anti-realist is saying that there is a speaker-independent fact of the matter about whether everyone getting tortured is morally worse than a world full of flourishing, and just denying that that means there will always be independent facts of the matter about moral claims.
But I didnāt think this was what moral anti-realism was about. I think Iād want to classify such a view as moral realist in an important sense, as it seems to involve realism about at least some moral claims.
Have I misunderstood what you were trying to convey with that passage?
This passage sounds to me like itās implying that the anti-realist position is: āSome moral claims may be objectively true, but many are neither objectively true nor objectively false.ā In this case, it sounds like the anti-realist is saying that there is a speaker-independent fact of the matter about whether everyone getting tortured is morally worse than a world full of flourishing, and just denying that that means there will always be independent facts of the matter about moral claims.
I should have chosen a more nuanced framing in my comment. Instead of saying, āSure, we can agree about that,ā the anti-realist should have said āSure, that seems like a reasonable way to use words. Iām happy to go along with using moral terms like āworseā or ābetterā in ways where this is universally considered self-evident. But it seems to me that you think you are also saying that for every moral question, thereās a single correct answer [...]ā
So the anti-realist isnāt necessarily conceding that āsurely a world where everyone gets tortured is worse than a world where everyone flourishesā is a successful argument in favor of moral realism. At least, itās not yet an argument for ambitious versions of moral realism (ones āworthy of the nameā according to my semantic intuitions).
I think Iād want to classify such a view as moral realist in an important sense, as it seems to involve realism about at least some moral claims.
Itās possible that you just have different semantic intuitions from me. It might be helpful to take a step back and ignore whether or not to classify a view as āmoral realism,ā and think about what it means for notions like moral uncertainty, the value of information for doing more work in philosophy, the prospect of convergence among peopleās normative-ethical views if they did more reflecting, etc. Because the view we are discussing here has relatively weak implications for all these things, I personally didnāt feel like calling it āmoral realism.ā
Ok, I think from this reply, your other reply to me, and the four posts youāve made thus far, Iām realising that (1) there are three views which I wouldāve felt were separate, and only the first of which Iād typically be inclined to call ādefinitely moral anti-realismā. These views are something like the following:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory
A position in which no strong claims are (yet?) made about what the single correct moral theory would be
A position in which most moral questionsāout of all those that could possibly be askedāmay lack definitively or singularly correct answers (even if some other moral questions have such answers)
But (2) it seems like you see these views as āin effectā very similar, and perhaps interchangeable. And it seems like youād consider them all āanti-realistā in the sort of sense you care about, whether or not we use that label for them.
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
(I tentatively suspect there are substantial differences in the implications of these views, which map onto what Iād typically think of as differences between the implications of moral realism and moral anti-realism. But my thoughts on that still seem hazy at the moment.)
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
Yes, but with an important caveat. The way you described the three views, it doesnāt make it clear that 2. and 3. have the same practical implications as 1. Whereas I intended to describe them in a way that leaves no possible doubt about that.
Hereās how I would change your descriptions to make them compatible with my views:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory ((no change))
A position in which no strong claims can ever be made about what the single correct moral theory would be.
A position in which the only moral questions that have a correct (and/āor knowable) answer are questions on which virtually everyone already agrees.
As you can see, my 2. and 3. are quite different from what you wrote.
Thanks for this post!
I find myself quite confused now. This passage sounds to me like itās implying that the anti-realist position is: āSome moral claims may be objectively true, but many are neither objectively true nor objectively false.ā In this case, it sounds like the anti-realist is saying that there is a speaker-independent fact of the matter about whether everyone getting tortured is morally worse than a world full of flourishing, and just denying that that means there will always be independent facts of the matter about moral claims.
But I didnāt think this was what moral anti-realism was about. I think Iād want to classify such a view as moral realist in an important sense, as it seems to involve realism about at least some moral claims.
Have I misunderstood what you were trying to convey with that passage?
I should have chosen a more nuanced framing in my comment. Instead of saying, āSure, we can agree about that,ā the anti-realist should have said āSure, that seems like a reasonable way to use words. Iām happy to go along with using moral terms like āworseā or ābetterā in ways where this is universally considered self-evident. But it seems to me that you think you are also saying that for every moral question, thereās a single correct answer [...]ā
So the anti-realist isnāt necessarily conceding that āsurely a world where everyone gets tortured is worse than a world where everyone flourishesā is a successful argument in favor of moral realism. At least, itās not yet an argument for ambitious versions of moral realism (ones āworthy of the nameā according to my semantic intuitions).
Itās possible that you just have different semantic intuitions from me. It might be helpful to take a step back and ignore whether or not to classify a view as āmoral realism,ā and think about what it means for notions like moral uncertainty, the value of information for doing more work in philosophy, the prospect of convergence among peopleās normative-ethical views if they did more reflecting, etc. Because the view we are discussing here has relatively weak implications for all these things, I personally didnāt feel like calling it āmoral realism.ā
Ok, I think from this reply, your other reply to me, and the four posts youāve made thus far, Iām realising that (1) there are three views which I wouldāve felt were separate, and only the first of which Iād typically be inclined to call ādefinitely moral anti-realismā. These views are something like the following:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory
A position in which no strong claims are (yet?) made about what the single correct moral theory would be
A position in which most moral questionsāout of all those that could possibly be askedāmay lack definitively or singularly correct answers (even if some other moral questions have such answers)
But (2) it seems like you see these views as āin effectā very similar, and perhaps interchangeable. And it seems like youād consider them all āanti-realistā in the sort of sense you care about, whether or not we use that label for them.
Does (2) sound like a roughly accurate depiction of your views?
(I tentatively suspect there are substantial differences in the implications of these views, which map onto what Iād typically think of as differences between the implications of moral realism and moral anti-realism. But my thoughts on that still seem hazy at the moment.)
Yes, but with an important caveat. The way you described the three views, it doesnāt make it clear that 2. and 3. have the same practical implications as 1. Whereas I intended to describe them in a way that leaves no possible doubt about that.
Hereās how I would change your descriptions to make them compatible with my views:
A position in which there may not even be a single correct moral theory ((no change))
A position in which no strong claims can ever be made about what the single correct moral theory would be.
A position in which the only moral questions that have a correct (and/āor knowable) answer are questions on which virtually everyone already agrees.
As you can see, my 2. and 3. are quite different from what you wrote.
Thanks, this helps me understand your views a bit more.