3 doubts about veganism

I keep thinking about what kind of identity would be useful for building a powerful animal advocacy movement. Here are 3 features of veganism that I often think about which make me doubt its usefulness.

Too maximalist

The official definition of veganism by the inventors of the term is the following:

“Veganism is a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as far as is possible and practicable—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose”

This basically amounts to “avoid doing bad things as far as possible.” The threshold sits right below what is impossible. I think that is way too ambitious. Doing your best to avoid harm at every circumstance shouldn’t be the criterion for inclusion to a social movement. We don’t expect human rights activists to avoid all forms of exploitation and cruelty as far as possible to qualify as human rights activists.

Some activists respond “No, veganism is the bare minimum. The ‘as far as possible and practicable’ part means it’s not about being perfect.”. But when I ask for examples of gratuitously harmful actions that veganism doesn’t forbid, at most I hear about instances of accidental uses of animal products without knowing. What these activists mean by “bare minimum” is that veganism doesn’t require you to become an activist and actively help animals. But in the end they think veganism covers everything harmful to animals.

Compare this with identities like “strictly plant-based,” “conscientious objector,” or “environmentalist.” None make such strong claims about acting rightly at every instance.

Here are a few concrete problems I see happening related to this:

  1. Debates over whether celebrity vegans are really vegan because of horse-riding, botox, or animal products in their clothing. In those debates, the exclusionary activists are correct that these acts are not vegan and therefore these celebrities are not vegan. But I don’t want to give up on the visibility and credibility these celebrities provide. So I’m not happy about excommunicating them.

  2. When plant-based protein companies test new ingredients on animals for regulatory approval, prominent infighting erupts about whether their products are still vegan. The exclusionary side is technically correct, but fighting against these products seems morally wrong.

  3. Generally, there is way too much infighting about which actions are really vegan. Because the definition is too maximalist, there is no easy way to shut these debates off.

People in animal advocacy circles fear being too permissive and condoning harm to animals. But being too prohibitive is also a danger to a movement’s political goals. Successful social movements recognise that. Sometimes I hear religious scholars saying things like “Smoking is a terrible thing to do and I strongly advise you against it but I will never ever claim that smoking is haram”. They are vigilant against declaring things haram without sufficient grounding.

When you are too prohibitive and especially vaguely prohibitive, your people constantly bicker about what’s halal and haram. Organised religion solved this problem by having official authorities on what’s permitted. Vegetarianism was also pretty clear about what’s forbidden and what’s not. Veganism is both too vague and too maximalist.

No space for sinners

In Sunni Islam, these two statements can both be true:

• It’s forbidden to drink alcohol

• Some Muslims drink alcohol

But try this with veganism:

• It’s forbidden to eat eggs

• Some vegans eat eggs

It doesn’t work. People will object to the second statement.

I find it regrettable that veganism expects perfect compliance. We need space for people to say: “Yes, this is wrongful behavior, but I am a human being with moral failings, and in this case I acted against my values”—without being immediately excommunicated. Islam did succeed in reducing alcohol consumption to the lowest levels in the world without having to excommunicate all alcohol-drinking members.

Too behaviour-focused

Veganism as an identity combines behavior and belief: you should avoid certain actions because of certain beliefs about animal ethics. But in practice, the behavioral part overshadows the belief part.

Other political identities like feminist, socialist, environmentalist focus more on political goals. Of course certain actions would disqualify someone from being a feminist, but when you hear someone is a feminist, your first thought isn’t about whether they meet a behavioral standard. You perceive them by how they view the world and their political goals.

This creates concrete problems:

1. We’re missing many ideologically aligned people who don’t satisfy the behavioral standard.

2. Our debates shift toward feasibility of behavioral standards instead of focusing on whether we genuinely care about animals, feel sorry about their suffering, and want a better world for them.