The short answer is that if cluelessness is true you arenât justified in doing what youâd do if it wasnât true. You can still do it, but you arenât being responsive to the right reasons.
But thatâs false. If cluelessness is true, then you canât tell what you should do in that case. But you still know what you should do in the case where cluelessness is false (at least, as well as you did before hearing the cluelessness argument) so you should do whatever you were going to do anyway. So the justified action is still the same as before, but with lower confidence.
This woulnât be the case if youâre 100% certain that cluelessness is true, but if cluelessness is true then itâs not justified to be 100% confident that cluelessness is true.
I address this objection here (Q3), if I understand what youâre saying correctly. (Iâd recommend first reading sec. 2.1 of the post for crucial background on the epistemology, though, as I noted in another comment.)
(In general, I think you should not expect this post to be a self-contained explanation of the argument by any means. Itâs a high-level summary.)
But itâs not answered there. If youâre pointing at the thing about how UEV isnât a point estimate but a range, thatâs still irrelevant: even if true, the preferred action is still decided by the scalar value that comes from taking your probability-weighted expectation of that range.
taking your probability-weighted expectation of that range
I think youâre misunderstanding the framework. The whole problem is that we canât assign a (non-arbitrary) âprobability-weighted expectationâ. Thatâs the motivation for representing with a range rather than a single expectation.
Yes, I understand that youâre saying thatâs a problem that you canât assign a probability-weighted expectation. Iâm pointing out that if you canât do that, then cluelessness doesnât support any claims that any other action (besides the highest-EV action based on the premise that you can assign a non-arbitrary probability-weighted expectation) is higher-EV, so you should do the previously-chosen highest-EV action anyway. Therefore cluelessness is irrelevant.
Ah, sorry, I thought you were making the first-order wager argument (Q3 here), but IIUC youâre making a metanormative wager argument as Toby suggested. I discuss why Iâm unconvinced of that here. (And as another commenter pointed out, this is supplemented by âWhy cluelessness mattersâ in the OP.)
Even if itâs true that itâs unjustified, thatâs not relevant. If the decision-making process canât justify any actions, you can do whatever you want. Might as well act as if it can and do whatever I would have done anyway. (It would be less justified, but⊠shrug)
Iâd be interested in reading the case for it
Conveniently, itâs not necessary to justify it and try to increase anyoneâs credence that itâs true, because the alternative doesnât affect what decision they should make, so they should behave as if itâs true regardless of the probability, anywhere from 0 to 100%.
But this argument is attacking the exact reasons you thought it was good to do the thing in the first place no? I.e. that you expected it would have positive consequences?
I think youâre basically describing the wager argument, which I think is in this post approximated by the âheuristicsâ counterargument.
Iâd be keen to see someone develop the wager argument more. (i.e. âwagerâ like in Pascalâs wager)
Cluelessness makes the belief that the preferred action has good consequences weaker, but it doesnât raise any other action above the otherwise-preferred action in terms of expected consequences. So itâs irrelevant to decision-making, and you should still do whatever you were going to do anyway.
Let me know if you have any arguments indicating otherwise. I was hoping this post would provide some.
Are you assuming that the previously preferred action would still have some normative force behind it? I think thatâs the bit thatâs confusing me. The cluelessness argument (if it goes throughâidk if it does or not, hence competition) attacks your reasons for preferring that action, so youâre back to the drawing board. It doesnât make much sense to still insist on the action when you find out that your reasons for preferring it are flawed.
Are you assuming that the previously preferred action would still have some normative force behind it?
Yes.
If cluelessness is false, then you have some preferred action.
If cluelessness is true, then your preferred action is unjustified.
Thereâs some level of credence in cluelessness. The worst case for your otherwise-preferred action is when p(cluelessness)=100%. In that case it doesnât matter what you do.
So you might as well do whatever you were going to do anyway.
Thereâs no case where cluelessness is relevant to your decision process.
I think weâll end up going in circlesâmy point is that cluelessness is a problem with the reasoning that gets you to your preferred action, so if it is true, then the reasoning is faulty and the preference is unjustified.
Also, since you can still have preferences if you believe in cluelessness, I donât quite know how youâd compare between your preference to act deontologically in cluelessness world and your preference to maximise impartial welfare in non-clueless world. Both would be good preferences in their respective worlds. IDK how the meta-normative comparison should go here.
Edit: to clarify, I think our crux might be at this metanormative level, i.e. at comparing cluelessness world preferences with non-cluelessness world preferences. I realise Iâm pretty agnostic on how to do that, but a good argument here could cause me to find the wager response to cluelessness more convincing.
comparing cluelessness world preferences with non-cluelessness world preferences
To decide whether you should act based on your cluelessness world preferences or your non-cluelessness world preferences, youâd have to use evidence (either empirical or theoretical) for which world youâre in.
But an ordinary consequentialist decision-making process would already take this evidence into account. (I think cluelessness-believers sometimes strawman cluelessness-skeptics and assume that they havenât thought of this or wouldnât update on such evidence.)
I think a more interesting crux is that cluelessness advocates believe that cluelessness undermines consequentialism while leaving deontology or virtue ethics relatively unscathed, but it seems to me that all the cluelessness arguments against consequentialism also undermine other decision-making systems as well.
The short answer is that if cluelessness is true you arenât justified in doing what youâd do if it wasnât true. You can still do it, but you arenât being responsive to the right reasons.
But thatâs false. If cluelessness is true, then you canât tell what you should do in that case. But you still know what you should do in the case where cluelessness is false (at least, as well as you did before hearing the cluelessness argument) so you should do whatever you were going to do anyway. So the justified action is still the same as before, but with lower confidence.
This woulnât be the case if youâre 100% certain that cluelessness is true, but if cluelessness is true then itâs not justified to be 100% confident that cluelessness is true.
I address this objection here (Q3), if I understand what youâre saying correctly. (Iâd recommend first reading sec. 2.1 of the post for crucial background on the epistemology, though, as I noted in another comment.)
(In general, I think you should not expect this post to be a self-contained explanation of the argument by any means. Itâs a high-level summary.)
But itâs not answered there. If youâre pointing at the thing about how UEV isnât a point estimate but a range, thatâs still irrelevant: even if true, the preferred action is still decided by the scalar value that comes from taking your probability-weighted expectation of that range.
I think youâre misunderstanding the framework. The whole problem is that we canât assign a (non-arbitrary) âprobability-weighted expectationâ. Thatâs the motivation for representing with a range rather than a single expectation.
(ETA: By default I plan not to reply further.)
Yes, I understand that youâre saying thatâs a problem that you canât assign a probability-weighted expectation. Iâm pointing out that if you canât do that, then cluelessness doesnât support any claims that any other action (besides the highest-EV action based on the premise that you can assign a non-arbitrary probability-weighted expectation) is higher-EV, so you should do the previously-chosen highest-EV action anyway. Therefore cluelessness is irrelevant.
Ah, sorry, I thought you were making the first-order wager argument (Q3 here), but IIUC youâre making a metanormative wager argument as Toby suggested. I discuss why Iâm unconvinced of that here. (And as another commenter pointed out, this is supplemented by âWhy cluelessness mattersâ in the OP.)
Yep, and I think I disagree that youâre justified in doing that, but Iâd be interested in reading the case for it.
Even if itâs true that itâs unjustified, thatâs not relevant. If the decision-making process canât justify any actions, you can do whatever you want. Might as well act as if it can and do whatever I would have done anyway. (It would be less justified, but⊠shrug)
Conveniently, itâs not necessary to justify it and try to increase anyoneâs credence that itâs true, because the alternative doesnât affect what decision they should make, so they should behave as if itâs true regardless of the probability, anywhere from 0 to 100%.
But this argument is attacking the exact reasons you thought it was good to do the thing in the first place no? I.e. that you expected it would have positive consequences?
I think youâre basically describing the wager argument, which I think is in this post approximated by the âheuristicsâ counterargument.
Iâd be keen to see someone develop the wager argument more. (i.e. âwagerâ like in Pascalâs wager)
Cluelessness makes the belief that the preferred action has good consequences weaker, but it doesnât raise any other action above the otherwise-preferred action in terms of expected consequences. So itâs irrelevant to decision-making, and you should still do whatever you were going to do anyway.
Let me know if you have any arguments indicating otherwise. I was hoping this post would provide some.
Are you assuming that the previously preferred action would still have some normative force behind it? I think thatâs the bit thatâs confusing me. The cluelessness argument (if it goes throughâidk if it does or not, hence competition) attacks your reasons for preferring that action, so youâre back to the drawing board. It doesnât make much sense to still insist on the action when you find out that your reasons for preferring it are flawed.
Yes.
If cluelessness is false, then you have some preferred action.
If cluelessness is true, then your preferred action is unjustified.
Thereâs some level of credence in cluelessness. The worst case for your otherwise-preferred action is when p(cluelessness)=100%. In that case it doesnât matter what you do.
So you might as well do whatever you were going to do anyway.
Thereâs no case where cluelessness is relevant to your decision process.
I think weâll end up going in circlesâmy point is that cluelessness is a problem with the reasoning that gets you to your preferred action, so if it is true, then the reasoning is faulty and the preference is unjustified.
Also, since you can still have preferences if you believe in cluelessness, I donât quite know how youâd compare between your preference to act deontologically in cluelessness world and your preference to maximise impartial welfare in non-clueless world. Both would be good preferences in their respective worlds. IDK how the meta-normative comparison should go here.
Edit: to clarify, I think our crux might be at this metanormative level, i.e. at comparing cluelessness world preferences with non-cluelessness world preferences. I realise Iâm pretty agnostic on how to do that, but a good argument here could cause me to find the wager response to cluelessness more convincing.
To decide whether you should act based on your cluelessness world preferences or your non-cluelessness world preferences, youâd have to use evidence (either empirical or theoretical) for which world youâre in.
But an ordinary consequentialist decision-making process would already take this evidence into account. (I think cluelessness-believers sometimes strawman cluelessness-skeptics and assume that they havenât thought of this or wouldnât update on such evidence.)
I think a more interesting crux is that cluelessness advocates believe that cluelessness undermines consequentialism while leaving deontology or virtue ethics relatively unscathed, but it seems to me that all the cluelessness arguments against consequentialism also undermine other decision-making systems as well.
âbut it seems to me that all the cluelessness arguments against consequentialism also undermine other decision-making systems as well.â
This seems important. Why do you think that?