A sequence on moral anti-realism and its implications
I published the firstpost “What is moral realism?” last year and have about five half-finished drafts stored somewhere, but then I got sidetracked massively. Tentative titles were:
1. What is moral realism? [published]
2. Against irreducible normativity
3. Is there a wager for moral realism?
4. Metaethical fanaticism (dialogue about the strange implications of an infinite “moral realism wager”)
5. [Untitled – something about “People aren’t born consequentialists; people live their lives in different modes; vocations are not just discovered but also chosen”]
6. Introspection-based moral realism
7. Why I’m a moral anti-realist (sequence summary)
8. Anti-realism is not nihilistic
9. Anti-realism: What changes?
Less bullet biting?
Treating peer disagreements about values differently
Moral uncertainty vs. moral underdetermination
I might find some time later this year to finish more of the posts, but I’m not sure I still want to do the entire sequence. I considered just skipping to posts 7. − 9. because that used to be my original plan, but then the project somehow took on a much larger scale. I’d be curious to what degree there’s interest on the following topics:
(a) What are the arguments against (various angles of) moral realism?
(b) What is it that people are even doing when they do moral philosophy?
(c) What do anti-realists think they’re doing; why do they care?
(d) Implications for moral reasoning if anti-realism is correct
What’s the status of this project? Even if you no longer plan to publish most of these posts, I suspect that some people would be interested in seeing even very rough versions of the material, and I’d be happy to look over anything you weren’t sure about posting!
I started working on them in December. The virus infected my attention, but I’m back working on the posts now. I have two new ones fully finished. I will publish them once I have four new ones. (If anyone is particularly curious about the topic and would like to give feedback on drafts, feel free to get in touch!)
Great to hear you’re still planning to write these!
I currently assign very high credence to anti-realism, but:
I don’t really know what I mean by that
I (at least believe I) basically act as if moral realism is true, due to:
“wager”-style reasoning (but I don’t know if it makes sense to do that)
not feeling I get why to care if anti-realism is “correct”
I don’t really know if I’d actually act differently if I decided to “act as if an antirealist”
So all the tentative titles and four topics you listed sound very interesting to me, and like things I’ve wanted to write about but doubt I’ll get around to (partly because I lack the relevant background).
A sequence on moral anti-realism and its implications
I published the firstpost “What is moral realism?” last year and have about five half-finished drafts stored somewhere, but then I got sidetracked massively. Tentative titles were:
1. What is moral realism? [published]
2. Against irreducible normativity
3. Is there a wager for moral realism?
4. Metaethical fanaticism (dialogue about the strange implications of an infinite “moral realism wager”)
5. [Untitled – something about “People aren’t born consequentialists; people live their lives in different modes; vocations are not just discovered but also chosen”]
6. Introspection-based moral realism
7. Why I’m a moral anti-realist (sequence summary)
8. Anti-realism is not nihilistic
9. Anti-realism: What changes?
Less bullet biting?
Treating peer disagreements about values differently
Moral uncertainty vs. moral underdetermination
I might find some time later this year to finish more of the posts, but I’m not sure I still want to do the entire sequence. I considered just skipping to posts 7. − 9. because that used to be my original plan, but then the project somehow took on a much larger scale. I’d be curious to what degree there’s interest on the following topics:
(a) What are the arguments against (various angles of) moral realism?
(b) What is it that people are even doing when they do moral philosophy?
(c) What do anti-realists think they’re doing; why do they care?
(d) Implications for moral reasoning if anti-realism is correct
What’s the status of this project? Even if you no longer plan to publish most of these posts, I suspect that some people would be interested in seeing even very rough versions of the material, and I’d be happy to look over anything you weren’t sure about posting!
I started working on them in December. The virus infected my attention, but I’m back working on the posts now. I have two new ones fully finished. I will publish them once I have four new ones. (If anyone is particularly curious about the topic and would like to give feedback on drafts, feel free to get in touch!)
Great to hear you’re still planning to write these!
I currently assign very high credence to anti-realism, but:
I don’t really know what I mean by that
I (at least believe I) basically act as if moral realism is true, due to:
“wager”-style reasoning (but I don’t know if it makes sense to do that)
not feeling I get why to care if anti-realism is “correct”
I don’t really know if I’d actually act differently if I decided to “act as if an antirealist”
So all the tentative titles and four topics you listed sound very interesting to me, and like things I’ve wanted to write about but doubt I’ll get around to (partly because I lack the relevant background).