Another post which I might work on for draft amnesty is a response to Julia Wiseâs you can have more than one goal, and thatâs fine, and Susan Wolfâs Moral Saints. Iâm less sure about finishing this one because it outlines a problem more than it raises a solution. Specifically, the problem is that:
Moral reasoning (especially consequentialist reasoning) canât limit itself. Even if you have to take breaks from doing good in order to do more good, youâre taking that break because it helps you do more good.
Consequentialist reasoning doesnât permit valuing (other) ends for themselves (in a way that you wouldnât impartially maximise).
But (and this is Wolfâs point and to a lesser extent Juliaâs), a good life contains values which are non-moral.
The essay is mostly me struggling with trying to ground the kind of advice which Julia gives, i.e. to limit your pursuit of impartial good to one section of your life.
I feel like there are a lot of articles about âvalue pluralismâ and such, another one being Tyler Altermanâs Effective Altruism in the Garden of Ends. This position appears to be more popular and in vogue than a more traditional utilitarian view that an agentâs subjective experiences should not be valued more highly terminally than that of other moral patients.
I would like to see an article (and maybe would write it someday) that we should primarily treat any naive favoritism for our own well-being as agents as instrumental to maximizing well-being, rather than having multiple terminal values.
Interesting! One of the most salient aspects of Wolfâs article, to me, was her argument that a consequentialist who instrumentally valued other things (like family, personal well-being etc) as a means to their ultimate goal would:
a) not really value those things (because she ~argues that valuing is valuing non-instrumentally) b) be open to (or compelled to) take opportunities to lessen their instrumental values if that would lead to better ends. For example, a consequentialist who could go on a special meditation retreat which would make them care less about their own wellbeing (or their family or etc...) should take that option, and would take it if their only non-instrumental value was the impartial good.
Another post which I might work on for draft amnesty is a response to Julia Wiseâs you can have more than one goal, and thatâs fine, and Susan Wolfâs Moral Saints.
Iâm less sure about finishing this one because it outlines a problem more than it raises a solution. Specifically, the problem is that:
Moral reasoning (especially consequentialist reasoning) canât limit itself. Even if you have to take breaks from doing good in order to do more good, youâre taking that break because it helps you do more good.
Consequentialist reasoning doesnât permit valuing (other) ends for themselves (in a way that you wouldnât impartially maximise).
But (and this is Wolfâs point and to a lesser extent Juliaâs), a good life contains values which are non-moral.
The essay is mostly me struggling with trying to ground the kind of advice which Julia gives, i.e. to limit your pursuit of impartial good to one section of your life.
I feel like there are a lot of articles about âvalue pluralismâ and such, another one being Tyler Altermanâs Effective Altruism in the Garden of Ends. This position appears to be more popular and in vogue than a more traditional utilitarian view that an agentâs subjective experiences should not be valued more highly terminally than that of other moral patients.
I would like to see an article (and maybe would write it someday) that we should primarily treat any naive favoritism for our own well-being as agents as instrumental to maximizing well-being, rather than having multiple terminal values.
Interesting! One of the most salient aspects of Wolfâs article, to me, was her argument that a consequentialist who instrumentally valued other things (like family, personal well-being etc) as a means to their ultimate goal would:
a) not really value those things (because she ~argues that valuing is valuing non-instrumentally)
b) be open to (or compelled to) take opportunities to lessen their instrumental values if that would lead to better ends. For example, a consequentialist who could go on a special meditation retreat which would make them care less about their own wellbeing (or their family or etc...) should take that option, and would take it if their only non-instrumental value was the impartial good.
Drafted! (directly because of upvotes + draft amnestyâs lower standards. Would never have finished it otherwise)