I endorse this for non-EA vegans who aren’t willing to donate the money to wherever it will do the most good in general, but as my other comments have pointed out if a person (vegan or non-vegan) is willing to donate the money to wherever it will so the most good then they should just do that rather than donate it for the purpose of offsetting.
I see you’ve taken the 10% Pledge, so I gather you’re willing to donate effectively.
While you might feel better if you both donate X% to wherever you believe it will do the most good and $Y to the best animal charities to offset your past animal consumption, I think you instead ought to just donate X%+$Y to wherever it will do the most good.
NB: Maybe you happen to think the best giving opportunity to help animals is the best giving opportunity in general, but if not then my claim is that your offsetting behavior is a mistake.
Offsetting has multiplier effects.. people constantly make significant sacrifices attempting to marginally improve their personal sustainability, so publicly offsetting decades worth of personal impact with a weeks’ earnings seems worth the statement
NB: I’d consider them regardless, but offsetting’s a solid nudge
We agree that there may be morally relevant differences between carbon offsetting and meat offsetting. But as I mention in my FAQ comment, given how the calculator is actually being used (i.e. by people who had no intention of changing their diet), the important question isn’t whether eating meat and then paying to offset it is morally equivalent to not eating the meat. The important question is whether eating meat and donating is morally better than eating meat and not donating. The answer to that seems like a resounding ‘yes’
“The important question is whether eating meat and donating is morally better than eating meat and not donating. The answer to that seems like a resounding ‘yes’”
Offsetting bad moral actions depends on 1) the action being off-settable, 2) the two actions are inseparable, and 3) presuming a rather extreme form of utilitarianism is morally correct.
In the case you provide, I think it fails on all three parts. The action isn’t off-settable. Most moral frameworks would look at the two actions separately. Donating to an animal welfare charity doesn’t first require you eat meat, and there is no forced decision to donate or not donate if you eat an animal. And if you accept moral offsetting is better in this case, you are upon to all sorts of the standard utilitarian critiques.
There are also separate justice concerns and whether you are benefiting the appropriate reference class (if you eat cow and donate to shrimp welfare in another country, is that appropriate offsetting?).
I think it’s fine to promote the endeavor (or at least its morally permissible). But saying it is morally better isn’t well-supported. It’s similar to the somewhat non-intuitive finding in moral philosophy that if choosing between A) not donating to charity, B) donating to an ineffective charity, and C) donating to an effective charity, choosing A over B may be morally permissible, but choosing B over C is not.
Sorry I’ve been unclear—let me clarify: When we use the term ‘offset,’ we mean it in a quantitative sense—doing an amount of good for animals that’s comparable in magnitude to the harm caused by one’s diet. Whether this good deed makes eating meat ethically equivalent to not eating meat is a complex philosophical question that reasonable people can disagree on. But for someone who is going to eat meat either way (which describes most of our users), adding a donation that helps farmed animals is clearly better than not adding that donation.
The calculator is simply a tool to help people understand what size of donation would create a comparable scale of positive impact to their diet’s negative impact. We’ve found this framing resonates with people who care about animals but aren’t ready to change their diet
The fourth objection, on who the victim is, has always seemed like the strongest explanation of the deontological moral difference to me. When you offset your CO2 emissions, you haven‘t actually harmed anyone. (I’m personally inclined to place higher credence on utilitarianism than most other moral theories, so I‘m not too bothered by this, and I also think it’s certainly better than the most plausible alternative – people eat meat but don’t offset it – but regardless, interesting philosophical question.)
I generally support this idea of diet offsetting, although purely morally speaking I have several objections, explained here: https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2019/08/22/carbon-offsetting-versus-meat-offsetting/
There are morally relevant differences between carbon offsetting and meat offsetting.
Offset objections narrowly focus on future behavior; most people are raised omnivore; I’m offsetting past consumption:
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/HJtfDKDdFFHhDiJXM/recommendations-for-charities-for-animal-suffering-offsets?commentId=iq3SrK9K2q8zwsuBL
Love this comment. This is an angle we’ve considered for encouraging vegans to donate
I endorse this for non-EA vegans who aren’t willing to donate the money to wherever it will do the most good in general, but as my other comments have pointed out if a person (vegan or non-vegan) is willing to donate the money to wherever it will so the most good then they should just do that rather than donate it for the purpose of offsetting.
Per my top-level comment citing Claire Zabel’s post Ethical offsetting is antithetical to EA, offsetting past consumption seems worse than just donating that money to wherever it will do the most good in general.
I see you’ve taken the 10% Pledge, so I gather you’re willing to donate effectively.
While you might feel better if you both donate X% to wherever you believe it will do the most good and $Y to the best animal charities to offset your past animal consumption, I think you instead ought to just donate X%+$Y to wherever it will do the most good.
NB: Maybe you happen to think the best giving opportunity to help animals is the best giving opportunity in general, but if not then my claim is that your offsetting behavior is a mistake.
Offsetting has multiplier effects.. people constantly make significant sacrifices attempting to marginally improve their personal sustainability, so publicly offsetting decades worth of personal impact with a weeks’ earnings seems worth the statement
NB: I’d consider them regardless, but offsetting’s a solid nudge
We agree that there may be morally relevant differences between carbon offsetting and meat offsetting. But as I mention in my FAQ comment, given how the calculator is actually being used (i.e. by people who had no intention of changing their diet), the important question isn’t whether eating meat and then paying to offset it is morally equivalent to not eating the meat. The important question is whether eating meat and donating is morally better than eating meat and not donating. The answer to that seems like a resounding ‘yes’
“The important question is whether eating meat and donating is morally better than eating meat and not donating. The answer to that seems like a resounding ‘yes’”
Offsetting bad moral actions depends on 1) the action being off-settable, 2) the two actions are inseparable, and 3) presuming a rather extreme form of utilitarianism is morally correct.
In the case you provide, I think it fails on all three parts. The action isn’t off-settable. Most moral frameworks would look at the two actions separately. Donating to an animal welfare charity doesn’t first require you eat meat, and there is no forced decision to donate or not donate if you eat an animal. And if you accept moral offsetting is better in this case, you are upon to all sorts of the standard utilitarian critiques.
There are also separate justice concerns and whether you are benefiting the appropriate reference class (if you eat cow and donate to shrimp welfare in another country, is that appropriate offsetting?).
I think it’s fine to promote the endeavor (or at least its morally permissible). But saying it is morally better isn’t well-supported. It’s similar to the somewhat non-intuitive finding in moral philosophy that if choosing between A) not donating to charity, B) donating to an ineffective charity, and C) donating to an effective charity, choosing A over B may be morally permissible, but choosing B over C is not.
Sorry I’ve been unclear—let me clarify: When we use the term ‘offset,’ we mean it in a quantitative sense—doing an amount of good for animals that’s comparable in magnitude to the harm caused by one’s diet. Whether this good deed makes eating meat ethically equivalent to not eating meat is a complex philosophical question that reasonable people can disagree on. But for someone who is going to eat meat either way (which describes most of our users), adding a donation that helps farmed animals is clearly better than not adding that donation.
The calculator is simply a tool to help people understand what size of donation would create a comparable scale of positive impact to their diet’s negative impact. We’ve found this framing resonates with people who care about animals but aren’t ready to change their diet
I agree, that’s why I generally support it.
The fourth objection, on who the victim is, has always seemed like the strongest explanation of the deontological moral difference to me. When you offset your CO2 emissions, you haven‘t actually harmed anyone. (I’m personally inclined to place higher credence on utilitarianism than most other moral theories, so I‘m not too bothered by this, and I also think it’s certainly better than the most plausible alternative – people eat meat but don’t offset it – but regardless, interesting philosophical question.)