Brazilian legal philosopher, postdoc in intergenerational justice, financial supervisor, GWWC Pledger Bachelor of Laws, Master and Doctor of Philosophy from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), having published articles and translations in the areas of Political Philosophy, Applied Ethics and Philosophy of Economics – with a recent focus on climate risks, Environmental and Social Responsibility, and intergenerational justice. Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, integrating the Ethics and Political Philosophy Laboratory (EPLAB) and the project Present Democracy for Future Generations. Also a member of the Graduate Committee and Special Studies Analyst in the area of supervision of non-banking institutions at the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB). Member of the Inclusive and Sustainable Solutions association (SIS) and of the Effective Altruism community in Brazil (AE Brasil). https://philpeople.org/profiles/ramiro-avila-peres
Ramiro
Thanks for this report. It’ll be quite useful.
I’d like to share some critical remarks I had previously sent RCG by e-mail:Definition of “RCG”
<Los RCG se definen como aquellos con el potencial de infligir un daño grave al bienestar humano a escala global. > (p.2; cf. p. 6)
This definition might be too wide – it could include the global financial crisis of 2008, for instance. It is constrained, though, by the subsequent sentence: <Si bien se han identificado diversos riesgos que cumplen con esta definición, el presente trabajo se enfoca en los riesgos asociados a la inteligencia artificial, los riesgos biológicos y los escenarios de reducción abrupta de la luz solar.>
However, afterwards, a lot of the material is based on scientific diplomacy, and preparedness for local disasters and insurance that is not directly related to these types of events. But then, it’s not clear why other risks are not considered, such as the threat of conflict, extreme global warming, or other risks with cascading effects. They provide historical examples of catastrophes; an ERALs like the Tambora eruption (1815-16) caused “the year without summer”, but didn’t kill more than 250k people; the ENSO event of 1876-79 killed around 30-50 million people (s. Our World in Data; https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-18-0159.1).
Also, I don’t get what you mean by “seguros por riesgos catastróficos” (p. 8); if you mean insurance for local disasters, sure, people should buy it more often, there’s probably a market failure… on the other hand, there is also significant moral hazard here: people will often fail to avoid risky regions because they are insured. However, if you mean RCG insurance… I really don’t know this could work, as no current insurance system could be expected to survive such a loss in global output – but it would interesting to explore some possible arrangements in depth[1].
2.Things I missed most:
a) More emphasis on geographical and economic aspects of Latin America
According to Wikipedia, Latin America has 656 million people, 20,000 km2, and a combined nominal GDP of US$5.188 trillion and a GDP PPP of US$10.285 trillion; but more than half of it is in Mexico and Brazil, which amount to 350 million people, 10,500 km2, and a combined GDP of aprox. US$4 trillion. And yet, they barely show up in the assessment; Brazilian policies are totally absent from appendix II.
Also, I think the report would have greatly benefitted from an assessment of the state capacity and fiscal space in Latin American countries (perhaps you considered it unnecessary, as it is taken into account by the INFORM index and by Dahl’s GCR Index?)
b) Historical examples of relevant disasters:
Such as Grande Seca—Wikipedia (included in the ENSO event of 1876-79), Haiti’s earthquake and cholera epidemics, Andean seismic and volcanic events, etc.3. Outdated reference?
“Se estima que los daños por desastres en América Latina y el Caribe han ascendido a unos US$20.000 millones anuales en una década, con más de 45.000 muertes y 40 millones de personas afectadas (Kiepi e Tayson, 2002)”.
Could we find a source more up to date? This is from more than twenty years ago, when the region’s GDP and population was quite smaller. By way of comparison, the National Confederation of Municipalities in Brazil estimates that natural disasters have caused losses of R$ 400 billion (US$S80 billion) in the last decade in Brazil alone (more conservative estimates put that value around half of this). If that sounds like a lot, consider that Newman and Noy (2023) estimate that global warming alone causes US$143 billion in damage per year in the world (of which 63% refers to the value of deaths), and that Latin America accounts for 8.4% of the world’s population and 7.5% of GDP – from which we could expect at least US$7 billion to US$13 billion of annual damage in the region just because of global warming.[1] What one usually wants from an insurance scheme is: a) pool the risk between different agents, and b) internalize ex ante the costs of risks, and c) hedge or protection against uncertain events. There are some proposed mechanisms along these lines: i) World Climate Bank (Broome & Foley, 2016); (ii) the Glasgow Loss and Damage Mechanism; iii) Cotton-Barratt’s proposal of insurance for dual-use pathogen research; etc.
Opportunity for Austrians
Article by Seána Glennon: “In the coming week, thousands of households across Austria will receive an invitation to participate in a citizens’ assembly with a unique goal: to determine how to spend the €25 million fortune of a 31-year-old heiress, Marlene Engelhorn, who believes that the system that allowed her to inherit such a vast sum of money (tax free) is deeply flawed.”
T20 Brasil | T20 BRASIL CALL FOR POLICY BRIEF ABSTRACTS: LET’S RETHINK THE WORLD
The T20 Brasil process will put forward policy recommendations to G20 officials involved in the Sherpa and Finance tracks in the form of a final communiqué and task forces recommendations.
To inform these documents, we are calling upon think tanks and research centres around the world – this invitation extends beyond G20 members – to build and/or reach out to their networks, share evidence, exchange ideas, and develop joint proposals for policy briefs. The latter should put forward clear policy proposals to support G20 in addressing global challenges.
Selection criteria
Policy briefs must be related to the 36 subtopics that have been selected based on (i) the suggestions received from more than 100 national and foreign think tanks and research centres that have already expressed their interest in engaging with the T20 Brasil process and activities and (ii) the three priorities spelt out by the G20 Brazil presidency. These subtopics are organised under the six Task Forces themes.
For me it’s hard to believe that companies will spend much more with compliance thatn what they are already spending with marketing and offsets to greenwash their reputations. And when we implement carbon taxes / markets, they’ll need to disclose that info anyway
Sorry for being contentious, but.… Cochrane is remarkably clever in his papers, but I fail to see cleverness here. For instance, one of his main rants is about SEC’s proposing that firms disclose their carbon footprint; it’d be financially irrelevant, right? However, there’s a strong consensus among economists and institutions on the need for higher carbon prices. So it’s expected that, in the long run, carbon intensive companies will pay more for their emissions; disclosing data on emissions is all about allowing investors to manage long-term financial transition risks (due to future carbon prices).
Am I wrong about this? I don’t think so – this is often quoted by regulators and companies as one of the reasons to disclose data on emissions; ofc, talk about “social responsibility” is better for optics. But see this IGM Poll and contrast (a) the consensus that such data will allow investors to make better decisions with (b) the uncertainty that it will be positive for climate change. Does Cochrane ignore this? Unlikely, he is super smart; Cochrane himself has written about carbon prices. So maybe he just doesn’t care enough, or I didn’t fully understand his point.
In case you’re still interested in the subject: Consultative document—disclosure of climate-related financial risks (bis.org)
Idea for free (feel free to use, abuse, steal): a tool to automatize donations + birthday messages. Imagine a tool that captures your contacts and their corresponding birthdays from Facebook; then, you will make (or schedule) one (or more) donations to a number of charities, and the tool will customize birthday messages with a card mentioning that you donated $ in their honor and send it on their corresponding birthdays.
For instance: imagine you use this tool today; it’ll then map all the birthdays of your acquaintances for the next year. Then you’ll select donating, e.g., $1000 to AMF, and 20 friends or relatives you like; the tool will write 20 draft messages (you can select different templates the tool will suggest you… there’s probably someone already doing this with ChatGPT), one for each of them, including a card certifying that you donated $50 to AMF in honor of their birthday, and send the message on the corresponding date (the tool could let you revise it one day before it). There should be some options to customize messages and charities (I think it might be important that you choose a charity that the other person would identify with a little bit—maybe Every.org would be more interested in it than GWWC). So you’ll save a lot of time writing nice birthday messages for those you like. And, if you only select effective charities, you could deduce that amount from your pledge.
Is there anything like that already?
Thanks. D’you have all the CURVE posts published as some sort of ebook somewhere? That would be helpful
Adding a new layer to your confusion: since most of the lives in question are probably newborns (as most of the mortality is captured by neonatal disorders), and since the time lag between one’s specific donation and its corresponding effects is likely more than 9 months, this means that one’s donation will probably impact the identity of the affected kids. If for some reason (e.g., non-identity problem) one believes that helping existing people is more important than helping future people, then this counts against donating to clean water projects.
(I totally disagree with this, ofc)
In case anyone is interested, Peter Turchin will show up on Monday in a study group I joined
The Sciences of Ethics and Political Philosophy Reading Group
Disentangling the evolutionary drivers of social complexity: A comprehensive test of hypotheses
Peter Turchin
Monday, November 13
2 PM [WET/UTC]
OnlineIn this session, the group will discuss the paper by Peter Turchin et al. (2022), “Disentangling the evolutionary drivers of social complexity: A comprehensive test of hypotheses” (Science Advances, 8(25). DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abn3517). Session with the confirmed presence of Peter Turchin.
Anyone interested in participating can send an email to Filipe Faria: filipefaria@fcsh.unl.pt.
The Sciences of Ethics and Political Philosophy Reading Group is an international monthly-assembling online reading group co-hosted by the CFCUL and the Ethics and Political Philosophy Lab (EPLab) of the IFILNOVA. More information about the group here.
Thanks for this.
I have seen many informative comments here, especially on the stats of the paper...
Let’s suppose your postulated “30% all mortality reduction” effect is real; on your figure on GBD cause of deaths above “neonatal disorders” occupy almost the same area. So, if such an effect is real, it likely has to affect neonatal disorders—i.e., preterm birth complications, neonatal encephalopathy due to birth asphyxia and trauma, neonatal sepsis and other neonatal infections, haemolytic disease and other neonatal jaundice, and other neonatal disorders.
What would cause an effect on neonatal disorders? Weel, I wonder if many of such “neonatal infections” are not caused by enteric pathogens—or other agents that will be affected by water treatment in general (see here and this). Besides that, diarrohea might affect the mother’s health and birth weight, etc.BTW look at this interesting Lancet case-control study (Levine et al., 2020) funded by Gates & Gates Foundation that follows children with mild and moderate-to-severe diarrhoea that seeked health care, concluding that even mild enteric infections (which might not show up as a factor in GBD) increased the risk of death overall.
Still, I wonder why clean water is not a priority for WHO and World bank (at least according to Kremer’s paper). Maybe other interventions have similarly surprising spillover effects—i.e., perhaps Malaria prevention and de-worming affect neonatal deaths, too (I’d have to check their own spreadsheets to see this).
Why aren’t you running the Effective Thesis Exceptional Research Award for 2023?
I Encontro Anual sobre Riscos Globais
OMG thanks for this. My bad. I edited the original to contemplate this.
It’s kind of sad to revisit this discussion during SBF’s trial
I recently heard a great episode on him on this podcast: https://spotify.link/pyTNXYsTODb
Well, if you feel nad about SBF & EA, or about GW losing U$900 mi to frauds [edit: oooups, as Tobias remarked “GiveWell didn’t lose $900 million to fraud. GiveDirectly lost $900′000 to fraud.”], think about how Red Cross lost $500 million in Haiti: https://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-red-cross-raised-half-a-billion-dollars-for-haiti-and-built-6-homes
[Question] Is iGEM really concerned with biosecurity? Remaining doubts after a shallow investigation
Come to Brazil. We can make room for +1bi individuals, easy. With nuclear winter, we may even manage to get some ski resorts ;)
(Ofc if we don’t start a war w Argentina. That’s the problem w South America)
Thanks for the post. I really appreciate this type of modeling exercise.
I’ve been thinking about this for a while, and there are some reflections it might be proper to share here. In summary, I’m afraid a lot of effort in x-risks might be misplaced. Let me share some tentative thoughts on this:
a) TBH, I’m not very concerned with precise values of point-estimates for the probability of human extinction. Because of anthropic bias, or the fact that this is necessarily a one-time event, the incredible values involved, and doubts about how to extrapolate from past events here, etc., So many degress of freedom, that I don’t expect the uncertainties in question to be properly expressed. Thus, if the overall “true” x-risk is 1% or 0.00000001%, that doesn’t make a lot of difference to me—at least in terms of policy recommendation.
I’m rather more concerned with odds ratios. If one says that every x-risk estimate is off by n orders of magnitude, I have nothing to reply; instead, I’m interested in knowing if, e.g., one specific type of risk is off, or if it makes human extinction 100 times more likely than the “background rate of extinction” (I hate this expression, because it suggests we are talking about frequencies).
b) So I have been wondering if, instead of trying to compute a causal chain leading from now to extinction, it’d be more useful to do backward reasoning instead: suppose that humanity is extinct (or reduced to a locked-in state) by 3000 CE (or any other period you choose); how likely is it that factor x figures in a causal chain leading to that?
When I try to consider this, I think that a messy unlucky narrative where many catastrophes concur is at least on a pair with a “paperclip-max” scenario. Thus, even though WW 3 would not wipe us out, it would make it way more likely that something else would destroy us afterwards. I’ll someday try to properly model this.
Ofc, I admit that this type of reasoning “makes” x-risks less comparable with near-termist interventions—but I’m afraid that’s just the way it is.
c) I suspect that some confusions might be due to Parfit’s thought-experiment: because extinction would be much worse than an event that killed 99% of humanity, people often think about events that could wipe us out once and for all. But, in the real world, an event that killed 99% of humanity at once is way more likely than extinction at once, and the former would probably increase extinction risk in many orders of magnitude (specially if most survivors were confined to a state where they would be fragile against local catastrophes). The last human will possibly die of something quite ordinary.
d) There’s an interesting philosophical discussion to be had about what “the correct estimate of the probability of human extinction” even means. It’s certainly not an objective probability; so the grounds for saying that such an estimate is better than another might be something like that it converges towards what an ideal prediction market or logical inductor would output. But then, I am quite puzzled about how such a mechanism could work for x-risks (how would one define prices? well, one could perhaps value lives with the statistical value of life, like Martin & Pyndick).