To be clear, I don’t think that most things are longtermist interventions with these permanent impacts (and most things aren’t trying to be).
Clearly some thing have had lasting effects. e.g. there were no electrical household items before the 19th century, and now they are ubiquitous and quite possibly will be with us as long as humanity lasts. Whereas if humanity had never electrified, the present would be very different.
That said, it is also useful to ask about the counterfactuals. e.g. if Maxwell or Edison or any other pioneer hadn’t made their discoveries, how different would we expect 2024 to be? In this case, it is less clear as someone else probably would have made these discoveries later. But then discoveries that build on them would have been delayed etc. I doubt that the counterfactual impact of Maxwell goes to zero until such a point as practically everything has been discovered (or everything downstream of electromagnetism). That said, it could easily have diminishing impact over time, as is typical of advancements (their impact does not scale with humanity’s duration).
But note that the paper actually doesn’t claim that a particular invention or discovery acts as an advancement. It suggests it is a possible model of the longterm impacts of things like that. One reason I bring it up is that it shows that even if it was a permanent advancement, then under a wide set of circumstances, it would still be beaten by reducing existential risk. And even if attempts to advance progress really were lasting advancements, the value could be negative if they also bring forward the end time.
I would love it if there was more investigation of the empirical measurement of such lasting effects, though it is outside of my field(s).
Interesting posts!
I don’t recall reading either of them before.
Paul’s main argument in the second piece is that progress “doesn’t have much effect on very long-term outcomes” because he expects this quality-of-life curve to eventually reach a plateau. That is a somewhat different argument. As I show in Shaping Humanity’s Longterm Trajectory, the value of advancements can be extremely large as they scale with the instantaneous value of the future. e.g. it is plausible that if civilisation has spread to billions of billions of worlds that having an extra year of this is worth a lot (indeed this is the point of the first part of ‘Astronomical Waste’). But it doesn’t scale with the duration of our future, so can get beaten by things like reducing existential risk that scale with duration as well.
So the argument that we are likely to reach a plateau is really an argument that existential risk (or some other trajectory changes) will be even more important than progress, rather than that progress may be as likely to be negative value as positive value. For that you need to consider that the curve will end and that the timing of this could be endogenous.
(That said, I think arguments based on plateaus could be useful and powerful in this kind of longtermist reasoning, and encourage people to explore them. I don’t think it is obvious that we will reach a plateau (mainly as we might not make it that far), but they are a very plausible feature of the trajectory of humanity that may have important implications if it exists, and which would also simplify some of the analysis.)