Future Matters #8: Bing Chat, AI labs on safety, and pausing Future Matters
Future Matters is a newsletter about longtermism and existential risk. Each month we collect and summarize relevant research and news from the community, and feature a conversation with a prominent researcher. You can also subscribe on Substack, listen on your favorite podcast platform and follow on Twitter. Future Matters is also available in Spanish.
A message to our readers
This issue marks one year since we started Future Matters. We’re taking this opportunity to reflect on the project and decide where to take it from here. We’ll soon share our thoughts about the future of the newsletter in a separate post, and will invite input from readers. In the meantime, we will be pausing new issues of Future Matters. Thank you for your support and readership over the last year!
All things Bing
Microsoft recently announced a significant partnership with OpenAI [see FM#7] and launched a beta version of a chatbot integrated with the Bing search engine. Reports of strange behavior quickly emerged. Kevin Roose, a technology columnist for the New York Times, had a disturbing conversation in which Bing Chat declared its love for him and described violent fantasies. Evan Hubinger collects some of the most egregious examples in Bing Chat is blatantly, aggressively misaligned. In one instance, Bing Chat finds a user’s tweets about the chatbot and threatens to exact revenge. In the LessWrong comments, Gwern speculates on why Bing Chat exhibits such different behavior to ChatGPT, despite apparently being based on a closely-related model. (Bing Chat was subsequently revealed to have been based on GPT-4).
Holden Karnofsky asks What does Bing Chat tell us about AI risk? His answer is that it is not the sort of misaligned AI system we should be particularly worried about. When Bing Chat talks about plans to blackmail people or commit acts of violence, this isn’t evidence of it having developed malign, dangerous goals. Instead, it’s best understood as Bing acting out stories and characters it’s read before. This whole affair, however, is evidence of companies racing to deploy ever more powerful models in a bid to capture market share, with very little understanding of how they work and how they might fail. Most paths to AI catastrophe involve two elements: a powerful and dangerously misaligned AI system, and an AI company that builds and deploys it anyway. The Bing Chat affair doesn’t reveal much about the first element, but is a concerning reminder of how plausible the second is.
Robert Long asks What to think when a language model tells you it’s sentient [🔉]. When trying to infer what’s going on in other humans’ minds, we generally take their self-reports (e.g. saying “I am in pain”) as good evidence of their internal states. However, we shouldn’t take Bing Chat’s attestations (e.g. “I feel scared”) at face value; we have no good reason to think that they are a reliable guide to Bing’s inner mental life. LLMs are a bit like parrots: if a parrot says “I am sentient” then this isn’t good evidence that it is sentient. But nor is it good evidence that it isn’t — in fact, we have lots of other evidence that parrots are sentient. Whether current or future AI systems are sentient is a valid and important question, and Long is hopeful that we can make real progress on developing reliable techniques for getting evidence on these matters. Long was interviewed on AI consciousness, along with Nick Bostrom and David Chalmers, for Kevin Collier’s article, What is consciousness? ChatGPT and Advanced AI might define our answer [🔉].
How the major AI labs are thinking about safety
In the last few weeks, we got more information about how the leading AI labs are thinking about safety and alignment:
Anthropic outline their Core views on AI safety [🔉]. The company was founded in 2021 by a group of former OpenAI employees, with an explicitly safety-focussed mission. They remain fundamentally uncertain about how difficult it will be to align very powerful AI systems — it could turn out to be pretty easy, to require enormous scientific and engineering effort, or to be effectively impossible (in which case, we’d want to notice this and slow down AI development before anything disastrous happens). Anthropic take a portfolio approach to safety research, pursuing multiple lines of attack, with a view to making useful contributions, however difficult things turn out to be.
OpenAI released Planning for AGI and beyond [🔉], by CEO Sam Altman, which is a more high-level statement of the company’s approach to AGI. We enjoyed the critical commentary by Scott Alexander [🔉]. (OpenAI outlined their approach to alignment research specifically back in August 2022).
Viktoria Krakovna shared a presentation on how DeepMind’s Alignment team thinks about AI safety (note that this does not necessarily represent the views of DeepMind as a whole).
Ezra Klein writes powerfully on AI risk in the New York Times [🔉]. (The noteworthy thing to us is less the piece’s content and more what its publication, and positive reception, reveals about the mainstreaming of AI risk concerns.)
In Global priorities research: Why, how, and what have we learned? [🔉], Hayden Wilkinson discusses global priorities research, argues that it is a high-impact research area, and summarizes some of its key findings so far.
Andy Greenberg’s A privacy hero’s final wish: an institute to redirect AI’s future [🔉] is a moving profile of the icon Peter Eckersley and the AI Objectives Institute, which he established in the year before his tragic and untimely passing.
In What AI companies can do today to help with the most important century [🔉], Holden Karnofsky suggests prioritizing alignment research, strengthening security; helping establish safety standards and monitoring regimes; avoiding hype and acceleration; and setting up governance mechanisms capable of dealing with difficult trade-offs between commercial and public interests.
Karnofsky also offers advice on How major governments can help with the most important century.
And finally, in Jobs that can help with the most important century, Karnofsky provides some career recommendations for mere individuals.
In LLMs are not going to destroy the human race [🔉], Noah Smith argues that, although AGI might eventually kill humanity, large language models are not AGI, may not be a step toward AGI, and there’s no plausible way they could cause human extinction.
Joseph Carlsmith’s doctoral thesis, A stranger priority? Topics at the outer reaches of effective altruism, examines how anthropics, the simulation argument and infinite ethics each have disruptive implications for longtermism. Highly recommended.
In How much should governments pay to prevent catastrophes? [🔉], Carl Shulman and Elliott Thornley argue that the goal of longtermists should be to get governments to adopt global catastrophic risk policies based on standard cost-benefit analysis rather than on arguments that stress the overwhelming importance of the far future.
In Preventing the misuse of DNA synthesis [🔉], an Institute for Progress report, Bridget Williams and Rowan Kane make five policy recommendations to mitigate risks of catastrophic pandemics from synthetic biology.
Patrick Levermore scores forecasts from AI Impacts’ 2016 expert survey, finding they performed quite well at predicting AI progress over the last five years.
In Why I think it’s important to work on AI forecasting [🔉], Matthew Barnett outlines three threads of research that he is currently pursuing which he believes could shed light on important aspects of how AI will unfold in the future
Allen Hoskin speculates on Why AI experts continue to predict that AGI is several decades away [🔉].
Matthew Barnett proposes a new method for forecasting transformative AI.
In Against LLM reductionism, Erich Grunewald argues that statements that large language models are mere “stochastic parrots” (and the like) make unwarranted implicit claims about their internal structure and future capabilities.
Experimental evidence on the productivity effects of generative artificial intelligence [🔉], by Shakked Noy and Whitney Zhang, examines the effects of ChatGPT on production and labor markets.
David Chapman published an online book, Better Without AI, outlining the case for AI risk and what individuals can do now to prevent it.
In How bad a future do ML researchers expect?, Katja Grace finds that the proportion of respondents to her survey of machine learning researchers who believe extremely bad outcomes from AGI are at least 50% likely has increased from 3% in the 2016 survey to 9% in the 2022 survey.
In a new Global Priorities Institute paper, Tiny probabilities and the value of the far future, Petra Kosonen argues that discounting small probabilities does not undermine the case for longtermism.
Reflection mechanisms as an alignment target — attitudes on “near-term” AI [🔉], by Eric Landgrebe, Beth Barnes and Marius Hobbhahn, discuss a survey of 1000 participants on their views about what values should be put into powerful AIs.
Are there ways to forecast how well a conversation about AI alignment with an AI researcher might go? In Predicting researcher interest in AI alignment [🔉], Vael Gates tries to answer this question by focusing on a quantitative analysis of 97 AI researcher interviews.
Joel Tan’s Shallow report on nuclear war (arsenal limitation) estimates that lobbying for arsenal limitation to mitigate nuclear war has a marginal expected value of around 33.4 DALYs per dollar, or a cost-effectiveness around 5,000 times higher than that of GiveWell’s top charities.
In The effectiveness of AI existential risk communication to the American and Dutch public, Alexia Georgiadis measures changes in participants’ awareness of AGI risks after consuming various media interventions. There is a summary [🔉] of this paper written by Otto Barten.
Larks’s A Windfall Clause for CEO could worsen AI race dynamics [🔉] argues that the proposal to make AI firms promise to donate a large fraction of profits if they become extremely profitable will primarily benefitting the management of those firms and thereby give managers an incentive to move fast, aggravating race dynamics and in turn increasing existential risk.
In What should be kept off-limits in a virology lab? [🔉], Kelsey Piper discusses the Proposed biosecurity oversight framework for the future of science, a new set of guidelines released by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) that seeks to change how research with the potential to cause a pandemic is evaluated.
Arielle D’Souza’s How to reuse the Operation Warp Speed model [🔉] claims that Operation Warp Speed’s highly successful public-private partnership model could be reused to jumpstart a universal coronavirus or flu vaccine, or the building of a resilient electrical grid.
Elika Somani shares some Advice on communicating in and around the biosecurity policy community [🔉].
Our Common Agenda, a United Nations report published in late 2021, proposed that states should issue a Declaration on Future Generations. In Toward a declaration on future generations [🔉], Thomas Hale, Fin Moorhouse, Toby Ord and Anne-Marie Slaughter consider how such a declaration should be approached and what it should contain.
In Technological developments that could increase risks from nuclear weapons: A shallow review [🔉], Michael Aird and Will Aldred explore some technological developments that might occur and might increase risks from nuclear weapons, especially risks to humanity’s long-term future.
Christian Ruhl’s Call me, maybe? Hotlines and global catastrophic risk [🔉], a shallow investigation by Founders Pledge, looks at the effectiveness of direct communications links between states as interventions to mitigate global catastrophic risks.
In The open agency model [🔉], Eric Drexler proposes an “open-agency frame” as the appropriate model for future AI capabilities, in contrast to the “unitary-agent frame” the author claims is often presupposed in AI alignment research.
Riley Harris summarizes two papers by the Global Priorities Institute: Longtermist institutional reform [🔉] by Tyler John & William MacAskill, and Are we living at the hinge of history? [🔉] by MacAskill.
Juan Cambeiro’s What comes after COVID? lays out some well-reasoned forecasts about pandemic risk. Cambeiro assigns a 19% chance to another pandemic killing 20M+ people in the next decade; and conditional on this happening, the most likely causes are a flu virus (50%) or another coronavirus (30%).
The model has been made available via the ChatGPT interface (to paid users).
OpenAI shared an early version with Paul Christiano’s Alignment Research Center to assess the risks of power-seeking behavior, particularly focussed on its ability “to autonomously replicate and gather resources”. (Detailed in the accompanying paper).
Holden Karnofsky is taking a leave of absence from Open Philanthropy to work on AI safety. He plans to work on third-party evaluation and monitoring of AGI labs. Alexander Berger moves from co-CEO to CEO.
The Elders, the organization of world leaders founded by Nelson Mandela, announced a new focus on existential risk reduction.
The Global Fund is awarding an additional $320 million to support immediate COVID-19 response and broader pandemic preparedness.
The Flares, a French YouTube channel and podcast that produces animated educational videos, released the third part of its series on longtermism.
A “Misalignment Museum”, imagining a post-apocalyptic world where AGI has destroyed most of humanity, recently opened in San Francisco.
Open Philanthropy announced a contest to identify novel considerations with the potential to influence their views on AI timelines and AI risk. A total of $225,000 in prize money will be distributed across the six winning entries.
The Centre for Long-Term Resilience is hiring an AI policy advisor. Applications are due April 2nd. Apply now.
Applications are open for New European Voices on Existential Risk (NEVER), a project that aims to attract talent and ideas from wider Europe on nuclear issues, climate change, biosecurity and malign AI. Apply now.
Sam Bowman is planning to hire at least one postdoctoral research associate or research scientist to start between March and September 2023 on language model alignment. Apply now.
The General Longtermism Team at Rethink Priorities is currently considering creating a “Longtermist Incubator” program and is accepting expression of interest submissions for a project lead/co-lead to run the program if it’s launched.
Audio & video
Gus Docker from the Future of Life Institute Podcast interviewed Tobias Baumann on suffering risks, artificial sentience, and the problem of knowing which actions reduce suffering in the long-term future [🔉].
Jen Iofinova from the Cohere For AI podcast interviewed Victoria Krakovna on paradigms of AI alignment.
Rational Animations published The power of intelligence, based on the Eliezer Yudkowsky’s article.
A new AI podcast hosted by Nathan Labenz and Erik Torenberg launched: The Cognitive Revolution.
AI Safety News February 2023: Unspeakable tokens, Bing/Sydney, Pretraining with human feedback
ChinAI #216: Around the Horn (10th edition)
European AI Newsletter #82: Europe’s Digital Decade
Conversation with Tom Davidson
Tom Davidson is a Senior Research Analyst at Open Philanthropy, where he studies potential risks from advanced artificial intelligence. He previously worked as a data scientist for BridgeU, an education technology startup, and taught science at a UK comprehensive school. Tom has a Masters in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford.
Future Matters: To begin with, could you explain why you think it’s important to understand and forecast AI takeoff dynamics?
Tom Davidson: There’s a few things. The most zoomed out answer is that it’s one thing to know when this big event is going to happen—and that is obviously useful for planning and preparing—but it’s also very useful to know how it’s going to play out, what the internal dynamics will be, and how long we’ll have between various different milestones. If you’re trying to practically anticipate what’s going to happen and affect it, then knowing what the dynamics are and what that process looks like is very useful for informing actions. So takeoff speeds is one important parameter in understanding how the transition to AI is going to happen in practice.
In terms of focusing specifically on the speed element of AI takeoff, I think that is strategically important for a few reasons. Probably the most salient is the question of how much time we have, before the arrival of AI systems that pose an existential risk, with systems that are similar to those really dangerous systems. If takeoff is really slow, then there are many things we could do: we could have years playing around with systems that are deceptively aligned or that are doing treacherous turns that we can observe in the lab; we could try out different techniques to avoid it; we could generate a real consensus around that as a risk, develop a real science of it, do a lot of empirical testing, etc. If takeoff is really fast, then we could have maybe mere months to do that kind of work without a concerted slowdown in AI progress. So takeoff speed seems really important for understanding how high the risks are, what kind of strategies will reduce them, and whether we can just wing it and do the experiments as we go or need to be planning in advance to really slow down when AI capabilities become potentially dangerous.
Then there are other reasons why takeoff speed is important. I think using AIs to solve alignment for us seems like a more promising plan if takeoff speed is slower because we have longer to figure out how to use these AIs in alignment and set up the workflows to do that effectively, and there’s more time between “AI is helpful in alignment” and “AI will cause a catastrophe if it’s misaligned”. My impression is that labs are expecting this time period to be longer than I think it will be by default, which provides another argument for agreeing ahead of time to significantly slow down AI progress when things become potentially dangerous.
Then there are questions about the number of actors that will be involved: if takeoff speed is faster then fewer actors, and actors that are already ahead, are more likely to be important, and new actors like governments are less likely to be important.
And there are questions about relative power dynamics, where with faster takeoff it seems more probable that a smaller initial actor ends up with a lot of power relative to other actors that were initially close to it.
Future Matters: You operationalize AI takeoff as the time between AI systems capable of automating 20% of cognitive tasks, and 100% of cognitive tasks. Did you choose these start and end points because they have particular theoretical and practical significance?
Tom Davidson: So some people have used the operationalization of AGI to superintelligence, which I do think is important and I do actually talk about that a bit. Now one reason why I didn’t want to just stick with that is that, in my view, by the time we have full blown AGI that can do all tasks humans can do, things are already going to be very fast and very crazy, and maybe the main period of existential risk has actually already happened. And so it’s probably missing most of the action to just focus on the speed of that transition to superintelligence. But if you think, like me, that in the run-up to AGI there will be strategically relevant warning shots, you want to have some metric so that you can more meaningfully talk about that run-up period.
The choice of 20% is pretty arbitrary. I wanted something which was more than AI doing just a few big tricks, like AI that automates driving and a couple of other similar things. I wanted it to be a big enough part of the economy that it involved multiple ‘big wins’, had an unambiguously massive impact on the world, and woke up many big actors to AI’s potential economic and strategic importance. So I wanted to go above 5%.
But I didn’t want it to be so late in the game that most of the action had already happened and maybe we’re already in the middle of the period of existential risk and things have already gone completely crazy. If I had chosen a startpoint where AI can do 50% or 70% of all economic tasks that would run the risk that, again, it would be too late in the day.
So 20% was me trading off between those two factors. I tried to choose a number that was high enough that AI was really a significant and pretty general phenomenon, but that was not so high that the existential risk period had already started.
I will say that if we’re in a quite long timelines world, and we only slowly get to that 20% automation point over like the next 20 or 30 years, then there’s a chance that the 20% threshold won’t look like AI being a big deal, because it could just look like a continuation of technological progress as normal, going at about 1% a year. So I do think that there’s limitations here and I haven’t thought of a good way to unambiguously choose a start point. But because most of my probability mass is in shorter timelines than that, the 20% seems like a good metric.
Future Matters: You draw a distinction between capabilities takeoff and impact takeoff. Could you explain those, how they might come apart and what the reason might be for looking at them separately?
Tom Davidson: Certainly. Capabilities takeoff speed is roughly how quickly do AI capabilities improve as we approach and surpass human level AI. So if the cleverest AI you have is insect intelligence one year, human intelligence next year, and then a month later you’ve got superintelligence, that’s very fast capabilities takeoff. But maybe you haven’t used your AI tool in the real world, so it hasn’t had any impact on the world during that time: capabilities takeoff just focuses on how clever and capable AI is, aside from whether you actually use it.
Whereas impact takeoff speed is about AI’s actual effect on the real world. You could have a really slow capabilities takeoff speed where AI goes up very slowly to human intelligence and beyond, and yet a very fast impact takeoff speed. For example, it might be that no one deploys AI tools, maybe due to government regulations or caution, and then at some point, AI forcibly circumvents your deployment decisions and transforms the whole world in just a few months, once it’s already superintelligent. Then you’ve got a slow capabilities takeoff speed, but a very fast impact takeoff speed. So I think it can be useful to distinguish between those two things.
Future Matters: Taking a step back, you describe the overall approach you take as a ‘compute-centric framework’ for AI forecasting, building on Ajeya Cotra’s Bio Anchors report. Could you characterize what’s distinctive about this framework?
Tom Davidson: Yes. I think the framework makes sense if you think we’re going to get AGI by scaling up and improving current algorithmic approaches within the deep learning paradigm, getting further improvements to transformers, and things like that—the kind of progress we’ve seen over the last 10 years. What’s distinctive about it is that it makes this big bold simplifying assumption, that the capability of an AI is equal to the amount of compute used to train it, multiplied by the quality of the algorithms used for training. And all kinds of algorithmic progress, the invention of the transformer, various optimizations around it, and any future architectural improvements are rolled into this parameter of the ‘quality of the algorithms used to train’ it. Then, in addition, those algorithms are assumed to improve pretty smoothly, as we put in more effort to designing and testing new algorithms. So we’re assuming away the possibility of a radically new approach to AI that doesn’t fit in with the recent trends where performance just seems to improve pretty smoothly, as we scale things up and discover new algorithms. Some people think that there’s going to be a new algorithmic approach that will lead us to AGI and break the trends of the last 10 years, and that’s very much not the tack that I’m taking here.
Future Matters: Could you say more about how this ‘compute centric’ assumption could turn out to be wrong? How does this affect your overall estimates?
Tom Davidson: You could think that there’s going to be a new paradigm which massively accelerates progress. My impression is that some people, especially those belonging to the MIRI cluster of thought, think that there could be a new algorithmic approach, which can actually achieve AGI with much less compute than we’re already using, or maybe comparable amounts. If that turns out to be true, then I think you can get a faster takeoff, because by the time we transition through that new paradigm, there’s already a large hardware overhang, and you can quickly scale up the compute on the new approach once you realize it’s working. And if these new approaches have better scaling properties than current approaches, scaling up compute is going to have pretty radical consequences. So to the extent that you put weight on that, I think it pushes towards faster takeoff and is a pretty scary world.
Another thing you could think is just that there’s no existing or nearby approach that will get us all the way to AGI, which could push towards a much slower takeoff. You could have current approaches scaling up to only 50% of cognitive tasks, then we need some totally new kind of paradigm to get us all the way, and there could be a delay while we struggle to find out what that is—that could in practice cause slow takeoff. Then it’s just hard to say what the dynamics would be, once we discovered that new paradigm: you can imagine takeoff being fast or slow. But either way there would be a pause before we found that new paradigm, which in some ways of measuring it would make takeoff slower. I do have some uncertainty about whether the whole cluster of current approaches will get us there at all, and that pushes me towards slower takeoff.
So uncertainty over this ‘compute centric’ assumption pushes in both directions. It makes a very fast takeoff, and a very slow takeoff, more likely than my framework predicts. But overall, for me, it probably pushes more towards faster takeoff because I find the idea that there’s a new type of approach that gets us there faster or that has better scaling properties, or that there’s some other discontinuity that the compute-centric framework ignores, more plausible. So for me that uncertainty overall pushes towards faster takeoff, but certainly will increase the tails in both directions.
Future Matters: Within the compute-centric framework, you try to estimate two quantities. First the capabilities distance that has to be traversed during takeoff, and second the speed at which those capabilities will be acquired. Focusing on the first quantity, what are the main lines of evidence informing your estimates of the effective FLOP gap?
Tom Davidson: This effective FLOP gap is saying how much more effective training compute (= physical compute * quality of training algorithms) we need to train AGI compared to AI that could automate only 20% of the economy. And there’s a few different lines of evidence and none of them are very strong evidence, unfortunately. I think there’s a huge amount of uncertainty in this parameter. But there are some of the things that push towards thinking that the effective FLOP gap is small.
For example, it seems like brain size has a fairly notable effect on cognitive ability. Human brain sizes differ by ±10% in each direction, and so you can look at measures of cognitive ability and how they vary by brain size. The differences aren’t massive, but if you scale that up and imagine that there was a brain that was three or ten times as big, and then extrapolate those differences in cognitive ability, it seems like they’d be plausibly big enough to fully cross the effective FLOP gap. So this suggests that increasing effective training compute by 10-100X could be enough to completely cross the gap, if the scaling of AI intelligence is comparable to this extrapolated scaling of human intelligence with brain size. And there are reasons to think that AI intelligence could scale even more rapidly, because you can be increasing the amount of data that AI systems get as you scale the brain size, which doesn’t happen in humans.
And you get a similar story if you make even more strained analogies to humans and other animals. If you compare human and chimpanzee brain size, the difference isn’t that big, but qualitatively there seems to be a big difference in intelligence. And again, this suggests that maybe a couple of orders of magnitude extra effective compute would be enough to make a really big difference if, again, the scaling of AI intelligence with model size is analogous to the scaling of chimp intelligence with brain size.
There’s one other argument for thinking the difficulty gap could be pretty narrow, which is a bit of a subtle one. The basic argument is that, historically, the way we’ve automated, say, 20% or 30% of our workflows is by getting pretty dumb and narrow technologies to do the automation and then rearranging our workflows to compensate. For instance, you used to do all this paperwork and store these stacks of papers, and then with a laptop you’re able to use the digital database, to replace the paper, and automate that, which saves you a lot of time. But it took decades for people to actually integrate this automation into their workflows and to change all the other aspects of their processes to get to a point where everyone is using laptops instead of pen and paper for everything. It takes a long time.
If, as some of these other arguments suggest, there could be a fairly quick transition from AI not being able to do 20% of cognitive work to being able to do 100% of it, if that’s only going to happen in five years or ten years, then there just won’t be time to do the standard thing we do where we rearrange the workflows to allow for partial automation. Maybe you get some AI systems which could automate 20% of your workflow if you had a couple of decades to integrate it—maybe Chat GPT is like this, maybe it could create tens of trillions of dollars in economic value if the whole economy oriented around it, which would take two decades. But in fact, if it’s only going to be 10 years before we develop something like AGI, then there’s just no time for ChatGPT to do that automation in practice. And so you actually need AI to be pretty advanced before it is able to automate 20% of your workflow without you having to spend a long time rearranging your workflow around it. Therefore, by the time it’s able to automate 20% of your work, with minimal efforts on your part, it’s actually not too far away from being able to automate everything. And that could give a reason why by the time AI is having really notable, significant impacts on people’s workflows, it’s actually surprisingly close to the point at which it’s able to just almost fully automate their workflows. Those are for me some of the stronger arguments in favor of a small effective FLOP gap.
The main argument in favor of a larger one, for me, is just that there’s such a wide variety of tasks in the economy— even in AI R&D (though to a lesser extent)—and they vary along many dimensions, like the time horizon over which they’re performed, the amount of social context they require, how repeatable they are, how much it matters if you make a mistake, etc. Those differences mean that AI could be much more suited to automate some of those tasks than others, based on how similar it is to the AI training objective, how expensive it is to fine-tune AI on horizons of that length, and how much training data we have for the task. So it seems like AI would have more competitive advantages at some tasks compared with others, and that could increase the time between it being able to automate the first task and it being able to automate the last tasks.
Future Matters: At the end of all this, you come away with a shorter median estimate for timelines than the bio anchors model, by about ten years, despite sharing several of the key assumptions. What are the main drivers of these shortened timelines in your analysis, relative to Ajeya’s?
Tom Davidson: I think the main thing is the partial automation from pre-AGI systems causing a speed up, especially in AI R&D. The basic story is, the bio anchors model makes its prediction by extrapolating the trend in hardware progress and extrapolating the trend in algorithmic progress. But it’s not accounting for the fact that before we get fully transformative AI, we’re going to get AI which is pretty useful for doing hardware R&D and designing new chips, pretty useful for writing code for various experiments we want to run automatically, and maybe pretty useful for generating a hundred ideas for new algorithmic approaches and then critiquing those ideas and then winnowing them down to the ten most promising and then showing them to the human. And you would expect that partial automation of R&D to speed up progress on both those dimensions, both the hardware and the algorithms. In which case the bio anchors extrapolation is too conservative. One thing that I’m doing with this analysis is modeling that process whereby we train some not quite transformative but pretty good AIs and they speed up progress on the hardware and the algorithmic R&D. And that just happens more and more as we approach AGI: we get more and more acceleration from that. When I model that as best as I can, the result is that this dynamic shortens timelines by six years or so.
Probably the next biggest factor is, compared to bio anchors, expecting higher spending on the very biggest AI training runs. Once you’ve got AI that can readily automate 50% of the economy, for example, that’s able to generate $25 trillion of value worldwide per year, assuming it was fully deployed, that’s just a huge amount of value and it seems like it would be well worth spending a trillion dollars on that training run. And there is even more incentive to do that if you’re being competitive with other actors who might want to get there first. And so I’m more willing than bio anchors to think that the spending on training runs could get pretty big because of this kind of dynamic. Some of the gain comes from just more economic growth, meaning there’s more money around to invest in this stuff. Some of it is that you get AI to automate fabs so they can make more chips, which allows for faster scale-up. But most of it is just more willingness to spend on training runs as a fraction of world GDP.
Future Matters: Another factor you have pushing towards shorter timelines is this idea that we’ll be “swimming in runtime compute” by the time we’re training human-level AI systems. Could you explain this?
Tom Davidson: The idea there is the following. Suppose that you took the median of the bio anchors where I think AGI took 1e35 FLOP to train, that you’ve just done that training run and that you’re going to use that FLOP you just used to train the system to run copies of the system. How many copies could you run? You’re going to be able to run an ungodly number of AIs immediately, just using that training compute.
Future Matters: Is this ratio between the compute required for model training vs model inference relatively stable?
Tom Davidson: Actually, you should expect that fraction to become more extreme as you do bigger training runs. So if you double the size of a model, the compute needed to run the model doubles, but the compute needed to train it by a factor of four. If you think that you need as much compute as the bio anchors median, then you’ll be able to run way more copies with the training compute than you can today Bio anchors median implies you’d need about 1010 times as much compute to train AGI as the biggest public training run to date, which means you’d only need 105 times as much compute to run the model. So if the current ratio is that you can immediately run 10 million systems with your training compute, then in the future with the bio anchors median estimate, you’d be able to run 105 times as many. So instead of 10 million, it would be 1 trillion. And I think if you run the numbers, that’s the kind of thing you get. And you might think this is odd: we trained AGI and now we can run 1 trillion of them. You can then maybe think that, in fact, if we wanted to match the human R&D workforce, rather than having 1 trillion AGIs, we can make do with 100 billion somewhat-less-capable-than-AGI systems. Maybe you use the kind of techniques that people are already using today, like chains of thought, or like having a hundred attempted answers to the question and then assessing them and then picking the best. Maybe there are other techniques for running your somewhat dumb AIs for ages and then combining their results in clever ways that can allow you to actually match or exceed the performance of a human worker, even if the individual AI systems are less clever than a human worker. And so the conclusion of this for me is that we could achieve full automation of, for example, R&D before we’ve trained any one AI system that is individually as smart as a human scientist. And we could just do that by training AIs that are a bit less smart, but being able to run so many, that cumulative output working together exceeds that of all human scientists working together.
Future Matters: Does this consideration generalize across the whole economy? Overall it seems like you end up kind of ‘moving’ the capabilities threshold for AGI a bit earlier, because there is this factor that always gets you a bit further than you think you are?
Tom Davidson: I think so. And it comes down to definitions of AGI. If you were defining AGI as ‘one system can on one forward pass match the output of one human brain on one forward pass’, then that takes just as much effective training compute to develop. But if your definition for AGI was something like ‘AI systems collectively can outperform human brains collectively on any task’ or ‘AI systems collectively could fully automate this particular sector’, then yes, I think that kind of AI is easier to train than I previously thought, maybe quite a bit easier. What’s interesting about this is that it’s a very strong argument, if you believed something like bio anchors median training requirements, and it’s a less strong argument, if you had much smaller training requirements, because then you’ve got less of this excess runtime compute lying around. So for me, it focuses the probability mass near the lower end of the bio anchors distribution.
Future Matters: At the current margin, if you wanted to improve your estimates of AI takeoffs, would you focus more on (1) trying to better estimate the parameters of the current model, (2) extending the model in various directions, or (3) developing a new model altogether?
Tom Davidson: The one thing I’m most interested in is trying to understand how much algorithmic progress is driven by cognitive work – generating insights and thinking about how the algorithms fit together in the architectures – versus just brute experimentation. This becomes really important in the later stages of takeoff, where if everything is just driven by coming up with better ideas today, then if you extrapolate that, you think that algorithmic progress will become crazy fast as you approach full AI automation as there will be be abundant cognitive work from AI. Whereas if you think it’s all about experiments, then progress can’t become that crazy fast because AI automation doesn’t immediately increase the amount of physical compute you’ve got access to and it’s a bit harder to really rapidly increase that. This gets at this question of time from almost full automation to superintelligence, which I think is something that is a bit under explored in the current report.
Future Matters: Thank you, Tom!
We thank Leonardo Picón and Lyl Macalalad for editorial assistance.