I graduated from Georgetown University in December, 2021 with degrees in economics, mathematics and a philosophy minor. There, I founded and helped to lead Georgetown Effective Altruism. Over the last few years recent years, I’ve interned at the Department of the Interior, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Nonlinear.
1. Marginal animal welfare cost effectiveness seems to robustly beat global health interventions. It may look more like 5x or 1000x but it is very hard indeed to get that number below 1 (I do think both are probably in fact good ex ante at least, so think the number is positive).
Spending on corporate cage-free campaigns for egg-laying hens is robustly[8] cost-effective under nearly all reasonable types and levels of risk aversion considered here.
“Using welfare ranges based roughly on Rethink Priorities’ results, spending on corporate cage-free campaigns averts over an order of magnitude more suffering than the most robust global health and development intervention, Against Malaria Foundation. This result holds for almost any level of risk aversion and under any model of risk aversion.”
2. The difference in magnitude of cost effectiveness (under any plausible understanding of what that means) between MakeAWish (or personal consumption spending for that matter) and AMF is smaller than between AMF (or pick your favorite) and The Humane League or AWF.
So it is more important to convince someone to give to e.g. the EA animal welfare fund if they were previously giving to AMF than to convince a non-donor to give that same amount of money to AMF.
At least to me, this seems counterintuitive, contrary to vibes and social/signaling effects, and also robustly true.
3. What people intuitively think of as the “certainty” that comes along with AMF et al doesn’t really exist. To quote my own tweet:
Yes, you can get robust estimates for “E[short run human deaths by malaria prevented per marginal dollar]” but the 2nd, …,nth order effects don’t disappear (or cancel out by default!) just bc u choose not to try to model them
4. The tractability of the two cause areas is similar...
5. But animal welfare receives way less funding. From the same comment as above:
Under standard EA “on the margin” reasoning, this shouldn’t really matter, but I analyzed OP’s grants data and found that human GCR has been consistently funded 6-7x more than animal welfare (here’s my tweet thread this is from)
SAN FRANCISCO, Sept 25 (Reuters) - ChatGPT-maker OpenAI is working on a plan to restructure its core business into a for-profit benefit corporation that will no longer be controlled by its non-profit board, people familiar with the matter told Reuters, in a move that will make the company more attractive to investors.
The case for a legal challenge seems hugely overdetermined to me:
Stop/delay/complicate the restructuring, and otherwise make life appropriately hard for Sam Altman
Settle for a large huge amount of money that can be used to do a huge amount of good
Signal that you can’t just blatantly take advantage of OpenPhil/EV/EA as you please without appropriate challenge
I know OpenPhil has a pretty hands-off ethos and vibe; this shouldn’t stop them from acting with integrity when hands-on legal action is clearly warranted
Thanks and I think your second footnote makes an excellent distinction that I failed to get across well in my post.
I do think it’s at least directionally an “EA principle” that “best” and “right” should go together, although of course there’s plenty of room for naive first-order calculation critiques, heuristics/intuitions/norms that might push against some less nuanced understanding of “best”.
I still think there’s a useful conceptual distinction to be made between these terms, but maybe those ancillary (for lack of a better word) considerations relevant to what one thinks is the “best” use of money blur the line enough to make it too difficult to distinguish these in practice.
Re: your last paragraph, I want to emphasize that my dispute is with the terms “using EA principles”. I have no doubt whatsoever about the first part, “genuinely interested in making the world better”
Thanks, it’s possible I’m mistaken over the degree to which “direct resources to the place you think needs them most” is a consensus-EA principle.
Also, I recognize that “genuinely interested in making the world better using EA principles” is implicitly value-laden, and to be clear I do wish it was more the case, but I also genuinely intend my claim to be an observation that might have pessimistic implications depending on other beliefs people may have rather than an insult or anything like it, if that makes any sense.
How much do you trust other EA Forum users to be genuinely interested in making the world better using EA principles?
This is one thing I’ve updated down quite a bit over the last year.
It seems to me that relatively few self-identified EA donors mostly or entirely give to the organization/whatever that they would explicitly endorse as being the single best recipient of a marginal dollar (do others disagree?)
Of course the more important question is whether most EA-inspired dollars are given in such a way (rather than most donors). Unfortunately, I think the answer to this is “no” as well, seeing as OpenPhil continues to donate a majority of dollars to human global health and development[1] (I threw together a Claude artifact that lets you get a decent picture of how OpenPhil has funded cause areas over time and in aggregate)[2]
Edit: to clarify, it could be the case that others have object-level disagreements about what the best use of a marginal dollar is. Clearly this is sometimes the case, but it’s not what I am getting at here. I am trying to get at the phenomenon where people implicitly say/reason “yes, EA principles imply that the best thing to do would be to donate to X, but I am going to donate to Y instead.” I’m guessing this mostly takes the form of people failing to endorse that they’re donations are optimally directed rather than that they do a bunch of ground-up reasoning and then decide to ignore the conclusion it gives, though.
Data is a few days old and there’s a bit of judgement about how to bin various subcategories of grants, but I doubt the general picture would change much if others redid the analysis/binning
Yes, this seems like an extremely good thing to do and I hope someone takes it on. LEEP and Shrimp Welfare Project seem like good models for what a small team can do.
I am not from South America, I am not well-positioned to work on this, but somebody really should do something. There’s lots to do.
Same, (sadly), but I’d be very happy to donate to such an effort (even something very early stage, pre 501c3 incorporation) and would try my best to get others to donate as well.
I’d also emphasize that screwworm elimination is the only intervention I know of in its class—that is, an animal welfare intervention with persistent, long-ish term impact. As I wrote in a shortform post a while back:
More, if you think there’s a non-trivial chance of human disempowerment, societal collapse, or human extinction in the next 10 years, this would be important to do ASAP because we may not be able to later.
Automated interface between Twitter and the Forum (eg a bot that, when tagged on twitter, posts the text and image of a tweet on Quick Takes and vice versa)
I’d be very surprised if you can’t get a job that pays much more than the sub teacher role- the gap between that and ~any EA org job is massive and inability to get the latter is only very weak evidence of inability to earn more.
Sorry if I missed this but this does depend a lot on location/willingness to move. The above assumes If you’re in the US and willing to move cities.
Also, living frugally to donate more is of course very virtuous if you take your salary to be a given, but from an altruistic perspective, insofar as they trade off, it’s probably much better to spend effort on finding a way to earn more.
This is a bit of a hobbyhorse of mine but this could look like “found a startup with a 5% chance of earning $10M” in addition to or instead of searching for higher salaried roles
Random sorta gimmicky AI safety community building idea: tabling at universities but with a couple laptop signed into Claude Pro with different accounts. Encourage students (and profs) to try giving it some hard question from eg a problem set and see how it performs. Ideally have a big monitor for onlookers to easily see.
Most college students are probably still using ChatGPT-3.5, if they use LLMs at all. There’s a big delta now between that and the frontier.
In Q1 we will launch a GPT builder revenue program. As a first step, US builders will be paid based on user engagement with their GPTs. We’ll provide details on the criteria for payments as we get closer.
This doesn’t obviously point in the direction of relatively and absolutely fewer small grants, though. Like naively it would shrink and/or shift the distribution to the left—not reshape it.
Yeah but my (implicit, should have made explicit lol) question is “why this is the case?”
Like at a high level it’s not obvious that animal welfare as a cause/field should make less use of smaller projects than the others. I can imagine structural explanations (eg older field → organizations are better developed) but they’d all be post hoc.
I made it into an audiobook
Spotify
Apple Podcasts
RSS: https://anchor.fm/s/fcbc9344/podcast/rss
It’s almost certainly imperfect—please feel free to let me know if/when you catch a mistake or anything off or distracting