(disclosure: gave feedback on the post/work at OAI)
I don’t personally love the corporation analogy/don’t really lean on it myself but would just note that IMO there is nothing euphemistic going on here—the authors are just trying one among many possible ways of conveying the gravity of the stakes, which they individually and OAI as a company have done in various ways at different times. It’s not 100% clear which are the “correct” ones both accuracy wise and effective communication wise. I mix things up myself depending on the audience/context/my current thinking on the issue at the time, and don’t think euphemism is the right way to think about that or this.
Miles_Brundage
Karma: 639
Meta-note re: my commenting non-anonymously:
To be clear, I ’d say the same thing to Nick if asked, and mean what I said re: “in everyone’s interest”—I assume he wants FHI to succeed. I suspect/hope Nick would wants friends/colleagues “to disagree with [him] both publicly and privately; … who will admonish [him], gently but firmly, with whatever grain of truth there is in any accusations against me.” (from this article https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/21/opinion/cancel-culture-friendship.html - while I don’t like the term cancel culture and, like OP here, don’t think it’s an apt description of this situation, some of the points are relevant here).
Also, I felt very conflicted about posting this, both because I’ve benefited in the past from both Nick’s work and him hiring me, and because posting here stress me a lot (I expect lots of downvotes in absolute terms, though unsure how things will net out). This all stresses me out a lot. But I went ahead because I want FHI to be able to move on and thrive.
Edit: note I tweaked this comment a fair bit after reflecting on it some more, especially the last part, and I also wanted to signal-boost one of the comments in the thread from Jonas referenced above, here: https://twitter.com/JonasSandbrink/status/1631677091996393472?s=20 The point about mentorship is a big part of what I was gesturing at re: management effectiveness.
(context: worked at FHI for 2 years, no longer affiliated with it but still in touch with some people who are)
I’d probably frame/emphasize things a bit differently myself but agree with the general thrust of this, and think it’d be both overdue and in everyone’s interest.
The obvious lack of vetting of the apology was pretty disqualifying w.r.t. judgment for someone in such a prominent institutional and community position, even before getting to the content (on which I’ve commented elsewhere).
I’d add, re: pre-existing issues, that FHI as an institution has failed at doing super basic things like at least semi-regularly updating key components of their website*; the org’s shortcomings re: diversity have been obvious from the beginning and the apology was the last nail in the coffin re: chances for improving on that front as long as he’s in charge; and I don’t think I know anyone who thinks he adds net positive value as a manager** (vs. as a researcher, where I agree he has made important contributions, but that could continue without him wasting a critical leadership position, and as a founder, where his work is done).
*e.g. the news banner thing displays 6 year old news; no publications at all were added to the publication page in all of last year, despite there definitely being several publications; etc.
**Edit: Sean’s comment above suggests he maybe thinks Nick added value as a manager during a period that didn’t overlap with mine, and I know Sean, so maybe I spoke too strongly here :) unclear if he meant as manager, or founder, or research visionary, or what, though. In any case, I think it is fair to say, from what I know, that many people who have been at FHI don’t think he’s a super active or effective manager.
I would have to think more on this to have a super confident reply. See also my point in response to Geoffrey Miller elsewhere here—there are lots of considerations at play.
One view I hold, though, is something like “the optimal amount of self-censorship, by which I mean not always saying things that you think are true/useful, in part because you’re considering the [personal/community-level] social implications thereof, is non-zero.” We can of course disagree on the precise amount/contexts for this, and sometimes it can go too far. And by definition in all such cases you will think you are right and others wrong, so there is a cost. But I don’t think it is automatically/definitionally bad for people to do that to some extent, and indeed much of progress on issues like civil rights, gay rights etc. in the US has resulted in large part from actions getting ahead of beliefs among people who didn’t “get it” yet, with cultural/ideological change gradually following with generational replacement, pop culture changes, etc. Obviously people rarely think that they are in the wrong, but it’s hard to be sure, and I don’t think we [the world, EA] should be aiming for a culture where there are never repercussions for expressing beliefs that, in the speaker’s view, are true. Again, that’s consistent with people disagreeing about particular cases, just sharing my general view here.
This shouldn’t only work in one ideological “direction” of course, which may be a crux in how people react to the above. Some may see the philosophy above as (exclusively) an endorsement of wokism/cancel culture etc. in its entirety/current form [insofar as that were a coherent thing, which I’m not sure it is]. While I am probably less averse to some of those things than the some LW/EAF readers, especially on the rationalist side side, I also think that people should remember that restraint can be positive in many contexts. For example, I am, in my effort to engage and in my social media activities lately, trying to be careful to be respectful to people who identify strongly with the communities I am critiquing, and have held back some spicy jokes (e.g. playing on the “I like this statement and think it is true” line which just begs for memes), precisely because I want to avoid alienating people who might be receptive to the object level points I’m making, and because I don’t want to unduly egg on critiques by other folks on social media who I think sometimes go too far in attacking EAs, etc.
FWIW despite having pretty diametrically opposed views on a lot of these things, I agree that there is something to the issue/divide you reference. It seems correlated with the “normie-EA vs. rationalist-EA” divide I mentioned elsewhere on this page, and I think there are potential tradeoffs from naively responding to the (IMO) real issues at stake on the other side of the ledger. How to non-naively navigate all this seems non-obvious.
I think it’s a bit more nuanced than that + added some more detail on my views below.
Happy to comment on this, though I’ll add a few caveats first:
- My views on priorities among the below are very unstable
- None of this is intended to imply/attribute malice or to demonize all rationalists (“many of my best friends/colleagues are rationalists”), or to imply that there aren’t some upsides to the communities’ overlap
- I am not sure what “institutional EA” should be doing about all this
- Since some of these are complex topics and ideally I’d want to cite lots of sources etc. in a detailed positive statement on them, I am using the “things to think about” framing. But hopefully this gives some flavor of my actual perspective while also pointing in fruitful directions for open-ended reflection.
- I may be able to follow up on specific clarifying Qs though also am not sure how closely I’ll follow replies, so try to get in touch with me offline if you’re interested in further discussion.
- The upvoted comment is pretty long and I don’t really want to get into line-by-line discussion of specific agreements/disagreements, so will focus on sharing my own model.Those caveats aside, I think some things that EA-rationalists might want to think about in light of recent events are below.
- Different senses of the word racism (~the “believing/stating that race is a ‘real thing’/there are non-trivial differences between them (especially cognitive ones) that anyone should care about” definition, and the “consciously or unconsciously treating people better/worse given their race”), why some people think the former is bad/should be treated with extreme levels of skepticism and not just the latter, and whether there might be a finer line between them in practice than some think.
- Why the rationalist community seems to treat race/IQ as an area where one should defer to “the scientific consensus” but is quick to question the scientific community and attribute biases to it on a range of other topics like ivermectin/COVID generally, AI safety, etc.
- Whether the purported consensus folks often refer to is actually existent + what kind of interpretations/takeaways one might draw from specific results/papers other than literal racism in the first sense above (I recommend The Genetic Lottery’s section on this).
- What the information value of “more accurate [in the red pill/blackpill sense] views on race” would even be “if true,” given that one never interacts with a distribution but with specific people.
- How Black people and other folks underrepresented in EA/rationalist communities, who often face multiple types of racism in the senses above, might react to seeing people in these communities speaking casually about all of this, and what implications that has for things like recruitment and retention in AI safety.
(will vaguely follow-up on this in my response to ESRogs’s parallel comment)
Note that there is now at least one post on LW front page that is at least indirectly about the Bostrom stuff. I am not sure if it was there before and I missed it or what.
And others’ comments have updated me a bit towards the forum vs. forum difference being less surprising.
I still think there is something like the above going on, though, as shown by the kinds of views being expressed + who’s expressing them just on EA Forum, and on social media.
But I probably should have left LW out of my “argument” since I’m less familiar with typical patterns/norms there.
Thanks for clarifying on the censorship point!
I do think it’s pretty surprising and in-need-of-an-explanation that it isn’t being discussed (much?) on LW—LW and EA Forum are often pretty correlated in terms of covering big “[EA/rationalist/longtermist] community news” like developments in AI, controversies related to famous people in one or more of those groups, etc. And it’s hard to think of more than 1-2 people who are bigger deals in those communities than Bostrom (at most, arguably it’s zero). So him being “cancelled” (something that’s being covered in mainstream media) seems like a pretty obvious thing to discuss.
To be clear, I am not suggesting any malicious intent (e.g. “burying” something for reputational purposes), and I probably shouldn’t have used the word censorship. If that’s not what’s going on, then yes, it’s probably just that most LWers think it’s no big deal. But that does line up with my view that there is a huge rationalist-EA vs. normie-EA divide, which I think people could agree with even if they lean more towards the other side of the divide than me.
Seeing the discussion play out here lately, and in parallel seeing the topic either not be brought up or be totally censored on LessWrong, has made the following more clear to me:
A huge fraction of the EA community’s reputational issues, DEI shortcomings, and internal strife stem from its proximity to/overlap with the rationalist community.
Generalizing a lot, it seems that “normie EAs” (IMO correctly) see glaring problems with Bostrom’s statement and want this incident to serve as a teachable moment so the community can improve in some of the respects above, and “rationalist-EAs” want to debate race and IQ (or think that the issue is so minor/”wokeness-run-amok-y” that it should be ignored or censored). This predictably leads to conflict.
(I am sure many will take issue with this, but I suspect it will ring true/help clarify things for some, and if this isn’t the time/place to discuss it, I don’t know when/where that would be)
[Edit: I elaborated on various aspects of my views in the comments, though one could potentially agree with this comment/not all the below etc.]
The Aaron Swartz thing is not really the same kind of thing as the others, on various levels. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Swartz
A few aspects of my model:
- Compute cost reduction is important for driving AI capabilities forward (among other things), and historically is mostly driven by things other than deployment of the most powerful systems (general semiconductor progress/learning curves, spillover from videogame related investments, deployment of systems other than the most powerful ones, e.g. machine translation, speech recognition, etc.). This may be changing as the share of NVIDIA’s datacenter revenue increases and more companies deploy powerful LMs but for a long time this was the case.
- Other drivers of AI progress such as investment in new algorithms via hiring people at top labs, algorithmic progress enabled by more compute, and increasing the amount of money spent on compute are only somewhat tied to deployment of the most powerful models. Again this may change over time but see e.g. all of DeepMind’s value provided to Google via non-cutting-edge (or fairly domain specific) things like speech synthesis, as well as claims that it is a long-term investment rather than something which requires immediate revenue. Again these things may change over time but they have been true for some time and still have at least some truth.
- Restraint is not all or nothing, e.g. given deployment of some system, it can be deployed more or less safely, there can be more or less alignment across companies on best practices, etc. And on the current margin, doing better w.r.t. safety is mostly bottlenecked by good ideas and people to execute on those ideas, rather than adjusting the “safety vs. speed” knob (though that’s relevant to an extent, too). Given that situation, I think there is a lot of marginal additional restraint to be done without preventing deployment or otherwise significantly compromising lab interests (again, this could change eventually but right now I see plenty of opportunity to do “restraint-y” things that don’t entail stopping all deployment).
Noting that in addition to the LW discussion linked below, there’s also some discussion on an earlier EA Forum post here: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/sFemFbiFTntgtQDbD/katja-grace-let-s-think-about-slowing-down-ai
Thanks for writing this, Katja, and Peter for sharing.
Agree with a lot of the specific points, though I found the title/thesis somewhat incongruent with the content.
The various instances (?) of “slowing down AI” that you talk about seem pretty different in nature to me, and not all seem like they really are about slowing down AI in the sense that I/my colleagues might construe it.
Reducing compute investment, gating compute access in some way, getting people to switch from capabilities work to safety work, increasing restraint on deployment, coordinating on best practices, raising the alarm, etc. seem to be pretty diverse things. And many are happening already. Some could reasonably count as “slowing down” to me, while others don’t (I’d maybe define slowing down AI as something like “reducing the rate of improvement in peak and/or average AI capabilities in the world, regardless of whether or how they are deployed or not”).
I agree that there is relatively little work on slowing AI in the above sense and that there are some misconceptions about it, but many of the arguments you make address misconceptions about the feasibility and value of AI policy generally, not slowing down specifically.
Related to this, I think some aspects of the post were predictably off-putting to people who aren’t already in these communities—examples include the specific citations* used (e.g. Holden’s post which uses a silly sounding acronym [PASTA], and Ajeya’s report which is in the unusual-to-most-people format of several Google Docs and is super long), and a style of writing that likely comes off as strange to people outside of these communities (“you can roughly model me as”; “all of this AI stuff”).
*some of this critique has to do with the state of the literature, not just the selection thereof. But insofar as there is a serious interest here in engaging with folks outside of EA/rationalists/longtermists (not clear to me if this is the case), then either the selections could have been more careful or caveated, or new ones could have been created.
Thanks for elaborating—I haven’t thought much about the bio comparison and political spending things but on funding a preferred lab/compute stuff, I agree that could be more sensitive to timelines than the AI policy things I mentioned.
FWIW I don’t think it’s as sensitive to timelines as it may first appear (doing something like that could still make sense even with longer timelines given the potential value in shaping norms, policies, public attitudes on AI, etc., particularly if one expects sub-AGI progress to help replenish EA coffers, and if such an idea were misguided I think it’d probably be for non-timeline-related reasons like accelerating competition or speeding things up too much even for a favored lab to handle).
But if I were rewriting I’d probably mention it as a prominent counterexample justifying some further work along with some of the alignment agenda stuff mentioned below.
In retrospect I should have made a clearer distinction between “things that the author thinks are good and which are mostly timeline-insensitive according to his model of how things work” and “things that all reasonable observers would agree are good ideas regardless of their timelines.” The stuff you mentioned mostly relates to currently-existing-AI-systems and management of their risks, and while not consensus-y, are mostly agreed on by people in the trenches of language model risks—for example, there is a lot of knowledge to share and which is being shared already about language model deployment best practices. And one needn’t invoke/think one way or the other about AGI to justify government intervention in managing risks of existing and near-term systems given the potential stakes of failure (e.g. collapse of the epistemic commons via scaled misuse of increasingly powerful language/image generation; reckless deployment of such systems in critical applications). Of course one might worry that intervening on those things will detract resources from other things, but my view, which I can’t really justify concisely here but happy to discuss in another venue, is that overwhelmingly the synergies outweigh the tradeoffs (e.g. there are big culture/norm benefits at the organizational and industry level—which will directly increase the likelihood of good AGI outcomes if the same orgs/people are involved—of being careful about current technologies compared to not doing so, even if the techniques themselves are very different).
Could you give an example or two? I tend to think of “~all of EA funds”-level interventions as more like timeline-shifting interventions than things that would be premised on a given timeline (though there is a fine line between the two), and am skeptical of most that I can think of, but I agree that if such things exist it would count against what I’m saying.
(meta note: I don’t check the forum super consistently so may miss any replies)
I think there’s probably some subtle subtext that I’m missing in your surprise or some other way in which we are coming at this from diff. angles (besides institutional affiliations, or maybe just that), since this doesn’t feel out of distribution to me—like, large corporations are super powerful/capable. Saying that “computers” could soon be similarly capable is pretty crazy to most people (I think—I am pretty immersed in AI world, ofc, which is part of the issue I am pointing at re: iteration/uncertainty on optimal comms) and loudly likening something you’re building to nuclear weapons does not feel particularly downplay-y to me. In any case, I don’t think it’s unreasonable for you/others to be skeptical re: industry folks’ motivations etc., to be clear—seems good to critically analyze stuff like this since it’s important to get right—but just sharing my 2c.