The EA community does not own its donors’ money

[Nick Whitaker]

A number of recent proposals have detailed EA reforms. I have generally been unimpressed with these—they feel highly reactive and too tied to attractive sounding concepts (democratic, transparent, accountable) without well thought through mechanisms. I will try to expand my thoughts on these at a later time.

Today I focus on one element that seems at best confused and at worst highly destructive: large-scale, democratic control over EA funds.

This has been mentioned in a few proposals: It originated (to my knowledge) in Carla Zoe Cremer’s Structural Reforms proposal:

• Within 5 years: EA funding decisions are made collectively

  • First set up experiments for a safe cause area with small funding pots that are distributed according to different collective decision-making mechanisms

(Note this is classified as a ‘List A’ proposal—per Cremer: “ideas I’m pretty sure about and thus believe we should now hire someone full time to work out different implementation options and implement one of them”)

It was also reiterated in the recent mega-proposal, Doing EA Better:

Within 5 years, EA funding decisions should be made collectively

Furthermore (from the same post):

Donors should commit a large proportion of their wealth to EA bodies or trusts controlled by EA bodies to provide EA with financial stability and as a costly signal of their support for EA ideas

And:

The big funding bodies (OpenPhil, EA Funds, etc.) should be disaggregated into smaller independent funding bodies within 3 years

(See also the Deciding better together section from the same post)

How would this happen?

One could try to personally convince Dustin Moskovitz that he should turn OpenPhil funds over to an EA Community panel, that it would help OpenPhil distribute its funds better.

I suspect this would fail, and proponents would feel very frustrated.

But, as with other discourse, these proposals assume that because a foundation called Open Philanthropy is interested in the “EA Community” that the “EA Community” has/​deserves/​should be entitled to a say in how the foundation spends their money. Yet the fact that someone is interested in listening to the advice of some members of a group on some issues does not mean they have to completely surrender to the broader group on all questions. They may be interested in community input for their funding, via regranting for example, or invest in the Community, but does not imply they would want the bulk of their donations governed by the EA community.

(Also—I’m using scare quotes here because I am very confused who these proposals mean when they say EA community. Is it a matter of having read certain books, or attending EAGs, hanging around for a certain amount of time, working at an org, donating a set amount of money, or being in the right Slacks? These details seem incredibly important when this is the set of people given major control of funding, in lieu of current expert funders)

So at a basic level, the assumption that EA has some innate claim to the money of its donors is basically incorrect. (I understand that the claim is also normative). But for now, the money possessed by Moskovitz and Tuna, OP, and GoodVentures is not the property of the EA community. So what, then, to do?

Can you demand ten billion dollars?

Say you can’t convince Moskovitz and OpenPhil leadership to turn over their funds to community deliberation.

You could try to create a cartel of EA organizations to refuse OpenPhil donations. This seems likely to fail—it would involve asking tens, perhaps hundreds, of people to risk their livelihoods. It would also be an incredibly poor way of managing the relationship between the community and its most generous funder—and very likely it would decrease the total number of donations to EA organizations and causes.

Most obviously, it could make OpenPhil less interested in funding the EA community. But additionally, this sort of behavior would also make EA incredibly unattractive to new donors—who would want to try to help a community of people trying to do good and then be threatened by them? Even for potential EAs pursuing Earn to Give, this seems highly demotivating.

Let’s say a new donor did begin funding EA organizations, and didn’t want to abide by these rules. Perhaps they were just interested in donating to effective bio orgs. Would the community ask that all EA-associated organizations turn down their money? Obviously they shouldn’t—insofar as they are not otherwise unethical—organizations should accept money and use it to do as much good as possible. Rejecting a potential donor simply because they do not want to participate on a highly unusual funding system seems clearly wrong headed.

One last note—The Doing EA Better post emphasizes:

Donors should commit a large proportion of their wealth to EA bodies or trusts . . . [as in part a] costly signal of their support for EA ideas

Why would we want to raise the cost of supporting EA ideas? I understand some people have interpreted SBF and other donors as using EA for ‘cover’ but this has always been pretty specious precisely because EA work is controversial. You can always donate to children’s hospitals for good cover. Ideally supporting EA ideas and causes should be as cheap as possible (barring obvious ethical breaches) so that more money is funneled to highly important and underserved causes.

The Important Point

I believe Holden Karnofsky and Alexander Berger, as well as the staff of OpenPhil, are much better at making funding decisions than almost any other EA, let alone a “lottery selected” group of EAs deliberating. This seems obvious—both are immersed more deeply in the important questions of EA than almost anyone. Indeed, many EAs are primarily informed by Cold Takes and OpenPhil investigations.

Why democratic decision making would be better has gone largely unargued. To the extent it has been, “conflicts of interest” and “insularity” seem like marginal problems compared to basically having a deep understanding of the most important questions for the future/​global health and wellbeing.

But even if we weren’t so lucky to have Holden and Alex, it still seems to be bad strategic practice to demand community control over donor resources. It would:

• Endanger current donor relationships

• Make EA unattractive to potential new donors

• Likely lower the average quality of grantmaking

• Likely yield nebulous benefits

• And potentially drive some of the same problems it purports to solve, like community group-think

(Worth pointing out an irony here: part of the motivation for these proposals is for grant making to escape the insularity of EA, but Alex and Holden have existed fairly separately from the “EA Community” throughout their careers, given that they started GiveWell independently of Oxford EA.)

If you are going to make these proposals, please consider:

• Who you are actually asking to change their behavior?

• What actions you would be willing to take if they did not change their behavior?

A More Reasonable Proposal

Doing EA Better specifically mentions democratizing the EA Funds program within Effective Ventures. This seems like a reasonable compromise. As it is Effective Ventures program, that fund is much more of an EA community project than a third party foundation. More transparency and more community input in this process seem perfectly reasonable. To demand that donors actually turn over a large share of their funds to EA is a much more aggressive proposal.

[Dustin Moskovitz]

If folks don’t mind, a brief word from our sponsors...

I saw Cremer’s post and seriously considered this proposal. Unfortunately I came to the conclusion that the parenthetical point about who comprises the “EA community” is, as far as I can tell, a complete non-starter.

My co-founder from Asana, Justin Rosenstein, left a few years ago to start oneproject.org, and that group came to believe sortition (lottery-based democracy) was the best form of governance. So I came to him with the question of how you might define the electorate in the case of a group like EA. He suggests it’s effectively not possible to do well other than in the case of geographic fencing (i.e. where people have invested in living) or by alternatively using the entire world population.

I have not myself come up with a non-geographic strategy that doesn’t seem highly vulnerable to corrupt intent or vote brigading. Given that the stakes are the ability to control large sums of money, having people stake some of their own (i.e. become “dues-paying” members of some kind) does not seem like a strong enough mitigation. For example, a hostile takeover almost happened to the Sierra Club in SF in 2015 (albeit for reasons I support!).

There is a serious, live question of what defines an EA right now. Are they longtermists? Do they include animals in the circle of moral concern? Shrimp? I’m not sure how you could establish a clear membership criteria without first answering these questions, and that feels backwards. I do think you could have separate pools of money based on separate worldviews, but you’d probably have to cut pretty narrowly which defeats the point.

As an example, the a top-rated fund at GWWC is the one for Climate Change: https://​​www.givingwhatwecan.org/​​charities/​​founders-pledge-climate-change-fund

Working on climate change is certainly important, but I see that as fairly suggestive evidence that a more democratric approach would be dilutive to EA principles (i.e. neglectedness in this case) and result in more popular cause selection.

[NegativeNuno]

It is 2AM in my timezone, and come morning I may regret writing this. By way of introduction, let me say that I dispositionally skew towards the negative, and yet I do think that OP is amongst the best if not the best foundation in its weight class. So this comment generally doesn’t compare OP against the rest but against the ideal.

One way which you could allow for somewhat democratic participation is through futarchy, i.e., using prediction markets for decision-making. This isn’t vulnerable to brigading because it requires putting proportionally more money in the more influence you want to have, but at the same time this makes it less democratic.

More realistically, some proposals in that broad direction which I think could actually be implementable could be:

• allowing people to bet against particular OpenPhilanthropy grants producing successful outcomes.

• allowing people to bet against OP’s strategic decisions (e.g., against worldview diversification)

• I’d love to see bets between OP and other organizations about whose funding is more effective, e.g., I’d love to see a bet between your and Jaan Tallinn on who’s approach is better, where the winner gets some large amount (e.g., $200M) towards their philanthropic approach

I’m particularly attracted to bets which have the shape of “you will change your mind about this in the future”.

At various points in the past, I think I would have personally appreciated having the option to bet...

• against hypothetically continued funding towards Just Impact beating GiveDirectly

• against your $8M towards INFER having been efficiently spent

• that the marginal $5M given out as grants in an ACX grants-type process would be better than your marginal $5M to forecasting (you are giving more than $5M/​yeear to forecasting, cf. your $8M grant to INFER).

• against worldview diversification being evaluated positively by a neutral third party.

• for closer or later AI timelines.

• on more abstract topics, e.g., “your forecasting grantmaking is understaffed/​underrated”, or “your forecasting grantmaking is too institutional”, “OP finds it too hard to exercise trust and would obtain better results by having more grant officers”.

• at the odds implied by some of your public forecasts.

Note that individual people inside OP may agree with some of the above propositions, even though “OP as a whole” may act as if they believe the opposite.

I have not myself come up with a non-geographic strategy that doesn’t seem highly vulnerable to corrupt intent or vote brigading.

You could also delegate the research of a strategy for democratic participation to other researchers, rather than doing it yourself, e.g., Robin Hanson’s time is probably buy-able with money. It would really surprise me if he (or other researchers) wasn’t able to come up with a few futarchy-adjacent ideas that were at least worth considering.

More broadly, I think that there is a spectrum between:

• OpenPhilanthropy makes all decisions democratically and we all sing Kumbaya

• Influencing OP decisions requires people to move to the Bay area and become chummy friends with its grants officers. Karnofsky writes tens of thousands of words in blogposts but does not answer comments. At the same time OP ultimately makes decisions which steer the EA community and reverberate across many lives.

Both extremes are caricatures, but we are closer to the second. Contrast with the Survival and Flourishing Fund, which has a number of regrantors with pots which grow proportionally to their estimated success.

I also think that comparison with FTX’s FF is instructive, because it was willing to trust a larger number of regrantors much earlier, and I think was able to produce a number of more experimental, ambitious and innovative grants as a result. For what it’s worth, my impression here is that Beckstead and MacAskill & the others in the FFF team did a great job here which was pretty much independent of FTX’s fraud.

So anyways, I’ve brought up some mechanisms here:

• Allowing people to bet against the success of your grants

• Allowing people to bet against the success of your strategic decisions

• Allowing people to bet that they are better at giving out grants than OP is

  • Or generally trying out systems other than grants officers.

• Using a wide number of regrantors rather than a small number of grant officers.

which perhaps get some the same benefits that democratization could produce for decision-making, namely information aggregation from a wider pool, and distribution of trust.

My sense is that OP could take these and other steps, and they could have some value of information, while perhaps not being all that risky if tried out at a small scale. It’s unclear though whether the managerial effort would be worth it.

PS: I liked the idea behind the Cause Exploration prizes, though I think that they did fail to produce a mechanism for addressing the above points, since the cause proposals were limited to Global Health & Wellbeing, and the worldview questions were too specific, whereas I think that the most important decisions are at the strategic level.

[Guy Raveh]

Strongly disagree about betting and prediction markets being useful for this; strongly agree about there being a spectrum here, where at different points the question “how do we decide who’s an EA” is less critical and can be experimented with.

One point on the spectrum could be, for example, that the organisation is mostly democratically run but the board still has veto power (over all decisions, or ones above some sum of money, or something).

[MichaelStJules]

Why would you bet against worldview diversification? All in on one worldview? Or something more specific about the way Open Phil does it?

[Mo Putera]

Likely to do with this; a little more discussion on that point here.

[NegativeNuno]

Yes, thanks

[Dawn Drescher]

I’d like to highlight this paragraph some more:

Both extremes are caricatures, but we are closer to the second. Contrast with the Survival and Flourishing Fund, which has a number of regrantors with pots which grow proportionally to their estimated success.

We’re all interested in mostly agent-neutral goals, so these should be much more aligned by default than agent-relative goals such as profit. That’s a huge advantage that we’re not using sufficiently (I think). Impact markets such as ours or that of the SFF make use of the alignment with regrantors and that between funders (through the S-Process).

The upshot is that there are plenty of mechanism that promise to solve problems for funders while (almost as a side-effect) democratizing funding.

With impact markets in particular we want to enable funders to find more funding opportunities and fund more projects that would otherwise be too small for them to review. On the flip side that means that a much more diverse set of fledgling projects gets funded. It’s a win-win.

[Alexander_Berger]

Hi Dustin :)

FWIW I also don’t particularly understand the normative appeal of democratizing funding within the EA community. It seems to me like the common normative basis for democracy would tend to argue for democratizing control of resources in a much broader way, rather than within the self-selected EA community. I think epistemic/​efficiency arguments for empowering more decision-makers within EA are generally more persuasive, but wouldn’t necessarily look like “democracy” per se and might look more like more regranting, forecasting tournaments, etc.

[tylermjohn]

Also, the (normative, rather than instrumental) arguments for democratisation in political theory are very often based on the idea that states coerce or subjugate their members, and so the only way to justify (or eliminate) this coercion is through something like consent or agreement. Here we find ourselves in quite a radically different situation.

[zdgroff]

It seems like the critics would claim that EA is, if not coercing or subjugating, at least substantially influencing something like the world population in a way that meets the criteria for democratisation. This seems to be the claim in arguments about billionaire philanthropy, for example. I’m not defending or vouching for that claim, but I think whether we are in a sufficiently different situation may be contentious.

[Tsunayoshi]

This argument seems to be fair to apply towards CEA’s funding decisions as they influence the community, but I do not think I as a self described EA have more justification to decide over bed net distribution than the people of Kenya who are directly affected.

[zdgroff]

Yes, that seems right.

[tylermjohn]

That argument would be seen as too weak in the political theory context. Then powerful states would have to enfranchise everyone in the world and form a global democracy. It also is too strong in this context, since it implies global democratic control of EA funds, not community control.

[zdgroff]

I guess I would think that if one wants to argue for democracy as an intrinsic good, that would get you global democracy (and global control of EA funds), and it’s practical and instrumental considerations (which, anyway, are all the considerations in my view) that bite against it.

[Dustin Moskovitz]

This is a great point, Alexander. I suspect some people, like ConcernedEAs, believe the specific ideas are superior in some way to what we do now, and it’s just convenient to give them a broad label like “democratizing”. (At Asana, we’re similarly “democratizing” project management!)

Others seem to believe democracy is intrinsically superior to other forms of governance; I’m quite skeptical of that, though agree with tylermjohn that it is often the best way to avoid specific kinds of abuse and coercion. Perhaps in our context there might be more specific solutions along those lines, like an appeals board for COI or retaliation claims. The formal power might still lie with OP, but we would have strong soft reasons for wanting to defer.

In the meantime, I think the forum serves that role, and from my POV we seem reasonably responsive to it? Esp. the folks with high karma.

I probably should have been clearer in my first comment that my interest in democratizing the decisions more was quite selfish: I don’t like having the responsibility, even when I’m largely deferring it to you (which itself is a decision).

[Aptdell]

Others seem to believe democracy is intrinsically superior to other forms of governance; I’m quite skeptical of that, though agree with tylermjohn that it is often the best way to avoid specific kinds of abuse and coercion.

My guess is that the current non-democratic EA institutions have serious flaws, and democratic replacement institutions would have even more serious flaws, and it’s still worth trying the democratic institutions (in parallel to the current ones) because 2 flawed structures are better than 1. (For example, because the democratic institutions fund important critical work that the current institutions do not.)

[Jason]

I think this likely depends on who else is funding work in a given area, and what the other funders’ flaws/​blind spots are. For instance, if the democratic EA alternative has many of the same flaws/​blind spots of larger funders in a cause area, diverting resources from current EA efforts would likely lead to worse outcomes in the cause area as a whole.

[Amber Dawn]

Yeah, I definitely agree with this!

An idea I’ve been kicking around in my head for a while is ‘someone should found an organization that investigates what existing humans’ moral priorities are’ - like, if there were a world democracy, what would it vote for?

An idea for a limited version of this within EA could be representatives for interest groups or nations. E.g., the Future Design movement suggests that in decision-making bodies, there should be some people whose role is to advocate for the interests of future generations. There could similarly be a mechanism where (eg) animals got a certain number of votes through human advocates.

[Jeff Kaufman 🔸]

GiveWell did some of this research in 2019 (summary, details):

We provided funding and guidance to IDinsight, a data analytics, research, and advisory organization, to survey about 2,000 people living in extreme poverty in Kenya and Ghana in 2019 about how they value different outcomes.

[Amber Dawn]

Oh awesome! I’ll check that out.

[Guy Raveh]

(Sorry, the formatting here doesn’t seem to work but I don’t know how to fix it)

I think there are two aspects that make “the EA community” a good candidate for who should make decisions:

1. The need to balance between “getting all perspectives by involving the entire world” and “making sure it’s still about doing the most good possible”. It’s much less vetting over value-alignment than the current state, but still some. I’m not sure it’s the best point on the scale, but I think it might be better than where we are currently. 1.1. another thought about this is that maybe we ought to fix the problem where “value alignment” is, as the other post argues, actually taken much more narrowly than agreeing about “doing the most good”.

2. The fact that EA is, in the end, a collaborative project and not a corporation. It seems wrong and demotivating to me that EAs have to compete and take big risks on themselves individually to try to have a say about the project they’re still expected to participate in. 2.1. Maybe a way for funders to test this is to ask yourselves—if there weren’t an EA community, would your plans still work as you expect them to? If not, than I think the community ought to also have some say on making decisions.

[Dustin Moskovitz]

A couple replies imply that my research on the topic was far too shallow and, sure, I agree.

But I do think that shallow research hits different from my POV, where the one person I have worked most closely with across nearly two decades happens to be personally well researched on the topic. What a fortuitous coincidence! So the fact that he said “yea, that’s a real problem” rather than “it’s probably something you can figure out with some work” was a meaningful update for me, given how many other times we’ve faced problems together.

I can absolutely believe that a different person, or further investigation generally, would yield a better answer, but I consider this a fairly strong prior rather than an arbitrary one. I also can’t point at any clear reference examples of non-geographic democracies that appear to function well and have strong positive impact. A priori, it seems like a great idea, so why is that?

The variations I’ve seen so far in the comments (like weighing forum karma) increase trust and integrity in exchange for decreasing the democratic nature of the governance, and if you walk all the way along that path you get to institutions.

[freedomandutility]

“ The variations I’ve seen so far in the comments (like weighing forum karma) increase trust and integrity in exchange for decreasing the democratic nature of the governance, and if you walk all the way along that path you get to institutions.”

Agree, but I think we should explore what decision making looks like at different points of that path, instead of only looking at the ends.

[Dustin Moskovitz]

I think we’re already along the path, rather than at one end, and thus am inclined to evaluate the merits of specific ideas for change rather than try to weigh the philosophical stance.

https://​​forum.effectivealtruism.org/​​posts/​​zuqpqqFoue5LyutTv/​​the-ea-community-does-not-own-its-donors-money?commentId=PP7dbfkQQRsXddCGb

[freedomandutility]

Fair!

I think Open Phil is unique in the EA Community for its degree of transparency which allows this level of community evaluation (with the exception of the Wytham Abbey purchase), and Open Phil should encourage other EA orgs should follow suit.

In addition to FTX style regranting experiments, I think (https://​​forum.effectivealtruism.org/​​posts/​​SBSC8ZiTNwTM8Azue/​​a-libertarian-socialist-s-view-on-how-ea-can-improve) it would be worth experimenting with, and evaluating:

1. The EA Community voting on grants that Open Phil considers to be just above or below its funding bar

2. The EA community voting on how to make grants from a small pot of Open Phil money

Using different voting methods (eg—quadratic voting, one person one vote, EA Forum weighted karma)

And different definitions of ‘the EA Community’ (staff and ex-staff across EA affiliated orgs, a karma cut off on the EA Forum, people accepted to EAG, people who have donated to EA Funds, etc)

[jackva]

Thanks Dustin!

I am agnostic wrt to your general argument but as the fund manager of the FP Climate Fund I wanted quickly weigh in, so some brief comments (I am on a retreat so my comments are more quickly written than otherwise and I won’t be able to get back immediately, please excuse lack of sourcing and polishing):

1. At this point, it seems the dominant view on climate interventions seems to be one of uncertainty on how they compare to GW style charity, certainly on neartermist grounds. E.g. your own Regranting Challenge allocated 10m to a climate org on renewables in Southeast Asia. This illustrates that OP seems to believe that climate interventions can clear the near-termist bar absent democratic pressures that dilute. While I am not particularly convinced by that grant (though I am arguably not neutral here!), I do think this correctly captures that it seems plausible that the best climate interventions can compare with GW-style-options, esp. when taking into account very strong “co-benefits” of climate interventions around air pollution and reducing energy poverty.
   

2. The key meta theory of impact underlying the Climate Fund is to turn neglectedness on its head and try to leverage the large societal attention to climate and improve how it is spent through targeted advocacy addressing blindspots of the mainstream response. Ultimately, as we are after maximizing impact, not maximizing ITN scores. it is quite plausible that neglectedness naively construed misleads us, neglectedness is an impact multiplier in expectation but not a good in itself, and, I’d argue, the ability to leverage large resource streams through advocacy is another impact multiploier, a mechanism by which high cost-effectiveness in a field as crowded as climate becomes at least plausible as long as one focuses on improving the vast resource allocation rather than just piling on. AFAIK, OP also believes that advocacy generally provides an impact multiplier when being risk neutral.

3. Given that GiveWell interventions are direct service delivery interventions that do not leverage any mechanisms such as advocacy or induced technological change, it also seems possible that leveraged climate interventions are competitive even if climate looks strictly worse than helping the poorest humans on a cause level. Put differently, the impact penalty imposed by risk aversion (if one is risk neutral wrt impact) or the different structure of the impact space (maybe in GHD, direct interventions are indeed better than more leveraged approaches) could make climate and other interventions competitive to GW style charity as well.
   

In case this sounds like I am very sure that climate should be included, this is not so.

I am just trying to say that it seems less clear than it would look on “naive” ITN grounds and that the “right” answer here might be independent of “democratic dilution”.

[Dustin Moskovitz]

Sure, I think you can make an argument like that for almost any cause area (find neglected tactics within the cause to create radical leverage). However, I’ve become more skeptical of it over time, both bc I’ve angled for those opps myself, and because there are increasingly a lot of very smart, strategic climate funders deploying capital. On some level, we should expect the best opps to find funders.

>> E.g. your own Regranting Challenge allocated 10m to a climate org on renewables in Southeast Asia. This illustrates that OP seems to believe that climate interventions can clear the near-termist bar absent democratic pressures that dilute.

The award page has this line “We are particularly interested in funding work to decarbonize the power sector because of the large and neglected impacts of harmful ambient air pollution, to which coal is a meaningful contributor. i.e. it’s part of our new air quality focus area. Without actually haven read the write-up, I’m sure they considered climate impact too, but I doubt it would have gotten the award without that benefit.

That said, the Kigali grant from 2017 is more like your framing. (There was much less climate funding then.)

[jackva]

Sure, I think you can make an argument like that for almost any cause area (find neglected tactics within the cause to create radical leverage).

Thank you for your reply and apologies for the delay!

To be clear, the reason I think this is a more convincing argument in climate than in many other causes is (a) the vastness of societal and philanthropic climate attention and (b) it’s very predictable brokenness, with climate philanthropy and climate action more broadly generally “captured” by one particular vision of solving the problem (mainstream environmentalism, see qualification below).

Yes, one can make this argument for more causes but the implication of this does not seem clear – one implication could be that there actually are much more interventions that in fact do meet the bar and that discounting leverage arguments unduly constrains our portfolio.

However, I’ve become more skeptical of it over time, both bc I’ve angled for those opps myself, and because there are increasingly a lot of very smart, strategic climate funders deploying capital. On some level, we should expect the best opps to find funders.

That seems fair and my own uncertainty primarily stems from this – I do think overall climate philanthropy has improved significantly over the last years and, in particular, with the influx of climate philanthropy from tech has become more ideologically diverse which seems good and more balanced overall (different biases from different funders).

>> E.g. your own Regranting Challenge allocated 10m to a climate org on renewables in Southeast Asia. This illustrates that OP seems to believe that climate interventions can clear the near-termist bar absent democratic pressures that dilute.

The award page has this line “We are particularly interested in funding work to decarbonize the power sector because of the large and neglected impacts of harmful ambient air pollution, to which coal is a meaningful contributor. i.e. it’s part of our new air quality focus area. Without actually haven read the write-up, I’m sure they considered climate impact too, but I doubt it would have gotten the award without that benefit.

It might be that this grant needs air pollution benefits to put it over the bar, but – as far as I can tell – there is no reason to think this grant is more strongly correlated with air pollution benefits than many other climate grants.

Cause areas are mental abstractions and whether one abstracts as “climate” or “clean energy acceleration” then seems to affect whether or not they can meet the bar. The Climate Fund is quite explicit about taking the integrated perspective and generally makes grants that also have significant co-benefits in the form of avoided air pollution and driving down the cost of clean energy.

It seems to me that consistency would require that we should assume other climate grants can meet the OP bar as well and that, by implication, the featuring of the Climate Fund on GWWC seems unproblematic.

FWIW, I strongly agree with you that most climate grants do not meet the bar and one needs to spend a lot more time per grant than in other areas and one needs an explicit model of the blindspots left by the mainstream climate response.

[Dustin Moskovitz]

>> To be clear, the reason I think this is a more convincing argument in climate than in many other causes is (a) the vastness of societal and philanthropic climate attention and (b) it’s very predictable brokenness, with climate philanthropy and climate action more broadly generally “captured” by one particular vision of solving the problem (mainstream environmentalism, see qualification below).

Vast attention is the mechanism that causes popular causes to usually have lower ROI on the margin; i.e. some of all that attention is likely competent.

I’m not sure what other causes you have in mind here. I think the argument with your two conditions applies equally well to large philanthropic areas like education, poverty/​homelessness, and art.

>> It seems to me that consistency would require that we should assume other climate grants can meet the OP bar as well

Absolutely, I agree they can. Do you publish your cost effectiveness estimates?

[Jeff Kaufman 🔸]

As an example, the top-rated fund at GWWC is the one for Climate Change

Nit: “a top-rated fund”

(GWWC brands many funds as “top-rated”, reflecting the views of their trusted evaluators. )

[David Krueger]

I think this idea is worth an orders-of-magnitude deeper investigation than what you’ve described. Such investigations seem worth funding.

It’s also worth noting that OP’s quotation is somewhat selective, here I include the sub-bullets:

Within 5 years: EA funding decisions are made collectively

• First set up experiments for a safe cause area with small funding pots that are distributed according to different collective decision-making mechanisms

  • Subject matter experts are always used and weighed appropriately in this decision mechanism

• Experiment in parallel with: randomly selected samples of EAs are to evaluate the decisions of one existing funding committee—existing decision-mechanisms are thus ‘passed through’ an accountability layer

• All decision mechanisms have a deliberation phase (arguments are collected and weighed publicly) and a voting phase (majority voting, quadratic voting..)

• Depending on the cause area and the type of choice, either fewer (experts + randomised sample of EAs) or more people (any EA or beyond) will take part in the funding decision. “”″

[Dustin Moskovitz]

Absolutely, I did not mean my comment to be the final word, and in fact was hoping for interesting suggestions to arise.

Good point on the more detailed plan, though I think this starts to look a lot more like what we do today if you squint the right way. e.g. OP program officers are subject matter experts (who also consult with external subject matter experts), and the forum regularly tears apart their decisions via posts and discussion, which then gets fed back into the process.

[AnonymousTurtle]

Thanks so much for sharing your perspective, as the main party involved.^[1] A minor nitpick:

As an example, the top-rated fund at GWWC is the one for Climate Change: https://​​www.givingwhatwecan.org/​​charities/​​founders-pledge-climate-change-fund

I think this might be misleading: there are 12 top-rated funds. The Climate Change one is one of the three “Top-rated funds working across multiple cause areas”.

1. ^

   (and thank you for all the good you’re doing)

[Dustin Moskovitz]

Ah I didn’t know that, thank you!

[Nathan Young]

Good comment.

But I think I don’t really buy the first point. We could come up with some kind of electorate that’s frustrating but better than the whole world. Forum users weighted by forum karma is a semi democratic system that’s better than any you suggest and pretty robust to takeover (though the forum would get a lot of spam)

My issue with that is I don’t believe the forum makes better decisions than OpenPhil. Heck we could test it, get the forum to vote on it’s allocation of funds each year and then compare in 5 years to what OpenPhil did and see which we’d prefer.

I bet that we’d pick OpenPhil’s slate from 5 years ago to the forum average from then.

So yeah, mainly I buy your second point that democratic approaches would lead to less effective resource allocation.

(As an aside there is democratic power here. When we all turned on SBF, that was democratic power—turns out that his donations did not buy him cover after the fact and I think that was good)

In short. I think the current system works. It annoys me a bit, but I can’t come up with a better one.

[MichaelStJules]

The proposal of forum users weighted by karma can be taken over if you have a large group of new users all voting for each other. You could require a minimum number of comments, lag in karma score by a year or more, require new comments within the past few months and so on to make it harder for a takeover, but if a large enough group is invested in takeover and willing to put in the time and effort, I think they could do it. I suppose if the karma lags are long enough and engagement requirement great enough, they might lose interest and be unable to coordinate the takeover.

You could stop counting karma starting from ~now (or some specific date), but that would mean severely underweighting legitimate newcomers. EDIT: But maybe you could just do this again in the future without letting everyone know ahead of time when or what your rules will be, so newcomers can eventually have a say, but it’ll be harder to game.

You could also try to cluster users by voting patterns to identify and stop takeovers, but this would be worrying, since it could be used to target legitimate EA subgroups.

[Nathan Young]

As I say, seems like this isn’t the actual problem, even if we did get the right group I wouldn’t trust them to be better than openphil.

[Dustin Moskovitz]

I was trying to highlight a bootstrapping problem, but by no means meant it to be the only problem.

It’s not crazy to me to create some sort of formal system to weigh the opinions of high-karma forums posters, though as you say that is only semi-democratic, and so reintroduces some of the issues Cremer et al were trying to solve in the first place.

I am open-minded about whether it would be better than openphil, assuming they get the time to invest in making decisions well after being chosen (sortition S.O.P.).

I agree that some sort of periodic rules reveal could significantly mitigate corruption issues. Maybe each generation of the chosen council could pick new rules that determine the subsequent one.

[Aptdell]

Maybe each generation of the chosen council could pick new rules that determine the subsequent one.

A simpler version of this is to have a system of membership, where existing members can nominate new members. Maybe every year some percentage of the membership gets chosen randomly and given the opportunity to nominate someone. In addition to having a process for becoming a member, there could also be processes for achieving higher levels of seniority, with more senior members granted greater input into membership decisions, and processes for nudging people who’ve lost interest in EA to let their membership lapse, and processes to kick out people found guilty of wrongdoing.

I assume there are a lot of membership-based organizations which could be studied: Rotary International, the Red Cross, national fraternities & sororities, etc.

A membership system might sound like a lot of overhead, but I think we’re already doing an ad-hoc, informal version of something like this. As NegativeNuno put it: “Influencing OP decisions requires people to move to the Bay area and become chummy friends with its grants officers.” My vague impression is that at least a few grantmakers like this system, and believe it is a good and necessary way for people to build trust. So if we step back and acknowledge that “building trust” is an objective, and it’s currently being pursued in an ad-hoc way which is probably not very robust, we can ask: “is there a better way to achieve that objective?”

[Jason]

How much are you thinking karma would be “worth”? It’s not that hard for an intelligent person to simulate being an EA if the incentives are right. If significant money were involved, you’d have to heavily restrict the list of organizations the user could vote for, which limits the point of a semi-democratic process in the first place.

E.g., if climate change were not out of bounds and karma were worth $10 a point, arguably the most impactful thing for climate change a non-EA moderately bright university student could do would be . . . mine karma by pretending to be an EA. I haven’t tried, but 40 to 60 karma per hour from someone consciously trying to mine karma sounds plausible.

I do potentially like the idea of karma giving the right to direct a very small amount of funding, as much for the information value as anything else.

[Amber Dawn]

Dustin, I’m pleased that you seriously considered the proposal. I do think that it could be worth funding deeper research into this (assuming you haven’t done this already) - both ‘should we expect better outcomes if funding decisions were made more democratically?’ and ‘if we were coming up with a system to do this, how could we get around the problems you describe?’ One way to do this would be a sort of ‘adversarial collaboration’ between someone who is sceptical of the proposal and someone who’s broadly in favour.

[ConcernedEAs]

Hi Dustin,

We’re very happy to hear that you have seriously considered these issues.

If the who-gets-to-vote problem was solved, would your opinion change?

We concur that corrupt intent/​vote-brigading is a potential drawback, but not an unsolvable one.

We discuss some of these issues in our response to Halstead on Doing EA Better:

There are several possible factors to be used to draw a hypothetical boundary, e.g.

• Committing to and fulfilling the Giving Pledge for a certain length of time

• Working at an EA org

• Doing community-building work

• Donating a certain amount/​fraction of your income

• Active participation at an EAG

• Etc.

These and others could be combined to define some sort of boundary, though of course it would need to be kept under constant monitoring & evaluation.

Given a somewhat costly signal of alignment it seems very unlikely that someone would dedicate a significant portion of their lives going “deep cover” in EA in order to have a very small chance of being randomly selected to become one among multiple people in a sortition assembly deliberating on broad strategic questions about the allocation of a certain proportion of one EA-related fund or another.

In any case, it seems like something at least worth investigating seriously, and eventually become suitable for exploring through a consensus-building tool, e.g. pol.is.

What would your reaction be to an investigation of the boundary-drawing question as well as small-scale experimentation like that we suggest in Doing EA Better?

What would your criteria for “success” be, and would you be likely to change your mind if those were met?

[Dustin Moskovitz]

Given that your proposal is to start small, why do you need my blessing? If this is a good idea, then you should be able to fund it and pursue it with other EA donors and effectively end up with a competitor to the MIF. And if the grants look good, it would become a target for OP funds. I don’t think OP feels their own grants are the best possible, but rather the best possible within their local specialization. Hence the regranting program.

Speaking for myself, I think your list of criteria make sense but are pretty far from a democracy. And the smaller you make the community of eligible deciders, the higher the chance they will be called for duty, which they may not actually want. How is this the same or different from donor lotteries, and what can be learned from that ? (To round this out a little, I think your list is effectively skin in the game in the form of invested time rather than dollars)

[Jason]

Because the donor lottery weights by donation size, the Benefactor or a large earning-to-give donor are much more likely to win than someone doing object-level work who can only afford a smaller donation. Preferences will still get funded in proportion to the financial resources of each donor, so the preferences of those with little money remain almost unaccounted for (even though there is little reason to think they wouldn’t do as well as the more likely winners). Psychologically, I can understand why the current donor lottery would be unappealing to most smaller donors.

Weighting by size is necessary if you want to make the donor lottery trustless—because a donor’s EV is the same as if they donated to their preferred causes directly, adding someone who secretly wants to give to a cat rescue doesn’t harm other donors. But if you employ methods of verifying trustworthiness, a donor lottery doesn’t have to be trustless. Turning the pot over to a committee of lottery winners, rather than a single winner, would further increase confidence that the winners would make reasonable choices.

Thus, one moderate step toward amplifying the preferences of those with less money would be a weighted donor lottery—donors would get a multiplier on their monetary donation amount based on how much time-commitment skin in the game they had. Of course, this would require other donors to accept a lower percentage of tickets than their financial contribution percentage, which would be where people or organizations with a lot of money would come in. The amount of funding directed by of Open Phil (and formerly, FTX) has caused people to move away from earning-to-give, which reduced the supply of potential entrants who would be willing to accept a significantly lower share of tickets per dollar than smaller donors. So I would support large donors providing some funds to a weighted donor lottery in a way that boosts the winning odds—either solo or as part of a committee—for donors who can demonstrate time-commitment skin in the game.^[1]

1. ^

   Contributing a smaller amount to the pot without taking any tickets is mostly equivalent—and perhaps optically superior—to taking tickets on a somewhat larger contribution.

[harfe]

In general, doing small-scale experiments seems like a good idea. However, in this case, there are potentially large costs even to small-scale experiments, if the small-scale experiment already attempts to tackle the boundary-drawing question.

If we decide on rules and boundaries, who has voting rights (or participate in sortition) and who not, it has the potential to create lots of drama and politics (eg discussions whether we should exclude right-wing people, whether SBF should have voting rights if he is in prison, whether we should exclude AI capability people, which organizations count as EA orgs, etc.). Especially if there is “constant monitoring & evaluation”. And it would lead to more centralization and bureaucracy.

And I think its likely that such rules would be understood as EA membership, where you are either EA and have voting rights, or you are not EA and do not have voting rights. At least for “EAG acceptance”, people generally understand that this does not constitute EA membership.

I think it would be probably bad if we had anything like an official EA membership.

[Dustin Moskovitz]

My decision criteria would be whether the chosen grants look likely to be better than OPs own grants in expectation. (n.b. I don’t think comparing to the grants people like least ex post is a good way to do this).

So ultimately, I wouldn’t be willing to pre-commit large dollars to such an experiment. I’m open-minded that it could be better, but I don’t expect it to be, so that would violate the key principle of our giving.

Re: large costs to small-scale experiments, it seems notable that those are all costs incurred by the community rather than $ costs. So if the community believes in the ROI, perhaps they are worth the risk?

[Nick Whitaker]

Appreciate you engaging!

[MichaelStJules]

What if you limited it to an Open Phil-selected list of organizations (e.g. Open Phil and EA Fund grantees) and set organization maximums (either uniformly or based on past budgets/​revenue, say)? Of course, that may defeat some of the purpose because it rules out a lot, but still gives the community more say in relative priority between Open Phil’s priorities. You could also set maximums per cause area (also defined by Open Phil) to prevent it from almost all going to a small number of causes.

Instead of voting, you could do donation matching with individual maximums to make sure people have some skin in the game. Basically like Double Up Drive, but with many more options.

EDIT: AndrewDoris suggested employee donation matching at EA orgs here: https://​​forum.effectivealtruism.org/​​posts/​​zuqpqqFoue5LyutTv/​​the-ea-community-does-not-own-its-donors-money?commentId=hDmQarAwpZLyRTCD7

That’s something Open Phil could earmark money to EA orgs for, and that would allow donations to organizations not already on Open Phil’s radar.

[MichaelStJules]

Or just directly give EA org employees regranting funds, with no need for them to donate their own money to regrant them. However, requiring some donation, maybe matching at a high rate, e.g. 5:1, gets them to take on at least some personal cost to direct funding.

[Aptdell]

The geographic strategy might work for economic development in poverty-stricken geographic regions. It seems plausible to me that this would e.g. help pay for public goods in Kenya that the GiveDirectly approach doesn’t currently do a good job of funding. I wonder if Justin Rosenstein would be interested in running a pilot?

[freedomandutility]

People who get accepted to EAG?

[Habryka]

I agree with some of the points of this post, but I do think there is a dynamic here that is missing, that I think is genuinely important.

Many people in EA have pursued resource-sharing strategies where they pick up some piece of the problems they want to solve, and trust the rest of the community to handle the other parts of the problem. One very common division of labor here is

I will go and do object-level work on our core priorities, and you will go and make money, or fundraise from other people in order to fund that work

I think a lot of this type of trade has happened historically in EA. I have definitely forsaken a career with much greater earning potential than I have right now in order to contribute to EA infrastructure and to work on object-level problems.

I think it is quite important to recognize that in as much as a trade like this has happened, this gives the people who have done object level work a substantial amount of ownership over the funds that other people have earned, as well as the funds that other people have fundraised (I also think this applies to Open Phil, though I think the case here is bunch messier and I won’t go into my models of the game theory here in-detail). Since the person who owns the funds has the ability to defect at basically any time on the arrangement and just do direct work themselves, the person who has been doing the object-level work so far has no ability to defect in the same way, and so this trade relies on the person doing object-level work trusting the person who made money to keep their future promise to act in both parties best interest.

My current guess is that the majority of EAs impact is downstream of trades like this, so taking this into account is a pretty huge deal in my books. For example, I think me being able to specialize into building infrastructure for the community, while trusting that I get to maintain some ability to direct the EA portfolio, was I think a huge multiplier on my impact in the world.

That means that I do think that a lot of the funds that have been raised within EA, though definitely not all of them, are meaningfully owned by the people who have forsaken direct control over that money in order to pursue our object-level priorities, and not the people in whose bank account the money is technically located.

To make the case clearer, I think there are many people who have forsaken a path in industry where they could have been quite successful entrepreneurs who could make many millions of dollars, and they do not currently have direct control over millions of dollars.

Overall I think the current balance of funds not reflecting this is a mistake, and I think in the world where this trade is working well, people who we think are responsible for a lot of the biggest positive impact would have been given hundreds of millions of dollars in exchange for that impact, and the ownership over the funds would be more clear. I am somewhat optimistic that more things like this will happen in the future as things like impact-certificates might take off more, which try to make this whole situation less fuzzy and more concrete.

Historically EA had a culture of the people running successful EA organizations not really being allowed to get rich from them running them (partially for valid signaling and grifter-related reasons), but this does mean that the current balance of funds does not reflect the fair and tacitly-agreed on allocation of funds, and this is a pretty precarious situation.

However, this does not mean that I think the money should be straightforwardly democratically allocated. I think the balance of funds and other sources of power in EA should roughly represent the balance of past positive impact that people have achieved (which includes the positive impact from making and fundraising money). I think given the heavy-tailedness of impact this also represents a very non-democratic allocation of funds, but it does meaningfully differ from putting the ownership clearly in the hands of the donors.

Of course, there are many donors who feel like they have not participated in any trade like this, though I think in most of those situations, I think it’s then the right call to charge a substantial surcharge on the literal cost of labor of someone doing object-level work, so that over time the cost for buying the altruistic impact does not just reflect the marginal cost of labor, but also (at least) the counterfactual cost of the people doing object-level work having abstained from a financially lucrative career.

As a concrete example of what this line of reasoning leads you to, you can take a look at the Lightcone Infrastructure salary policy. Our salary policy is that “we will pay you whatever we think you could have made in industry, minus 30%”. This compensation structure means we will pay many people salaries quite substantially above what they need to live. The 30% number is trying to find a roughly fair split of sacrifice between the donor and the worker, where the donor is paying 70% of market rate of the worker, and the worker is giving up 30% of their salary, together making progress towards the shared goal. This number is skewed towards the donor because salary doesn’t really capture most of the variance in income, since income is heavy-tailed and “salary” is anchored on the median outcome, and also because donors are selected from the pool of people who got lucky in the entrepreneurial lottery, and the balance they pay needs to also account for all the people who tried to make money for EA and failed.

My guess is the ⁷⁰⁄₃₀ split here is fairer, though still overall skewed quite a bit against the workers, but it’s at least an attempt to make the actual allocation of funds reflect the fair allocation better.

I think this means overall that saying that “the EA community does not own its donors’ money” is pretty inaccurate, though of course is still tracking something important. I do indeed think that many people who have done highly impactful work in the EA community have a quite strong and direct claim of ownership over the funds that have been made by various entrepreneurs who did earning-to-give, as well as various megadonors and pots of funds like Open Philanthropy’s endowment. I think in an ideal world this balance of funds and power would be made more explicit by having something like impact-certificate markets with evaluations from current donors, but we are pretty far from that, and in the meantime I do really care about not wrongly enshrining the meme that ignores all the past trades of division-of-labor that have happened (and are happening on a daily level).

[Michael_PJ]

I find this framing a bit confusing. It doesn’t to me seem that there is any obligation between EAs who are pursuing direct work and EA funders than there is between EA funders and any other potentially effective program that needs money.

Consider:

1. Alice gives up a lucrative career in order to go work in global health and development. However, Alice ends up just working for an ineffective organisation.

2. Bob is not an EA and never was in line for a high paying career, but ends up working for GiveDirectly.

Do we want to say that we should try and fund Alice more because we made some kind of implicit deal with her even though that money won’t produce effective good in the world? And if the money is conditional on the person doing good work… how is that different from the funders just funding good work without consideration for who’s doing it?

If I were going to switch to direct work the deal I would expect is “There is a large group of value-aligned funders, so insofar as I do work that seems high-impact, I can expect to get funded”. I would not expect that the community was going to somehow ensure I got well above median outcomes for the career area I was going into.

I’m not sure why you would expect more than that? Is this a talking point that I missed where people argued that there’s a deal? Is this some kind of clever “act as though you made the deals you would have wanted to have made, even if you actually didn’t” thing?

I think in an ideal world this balance of funds and power would be made more explicit by having something like impact-certificate markets with evaluations from current donors

I absolutely agree that altruistic labour is under-paid and a system like impact certificates would be great, what confuses me is the idea that people got into direct work today with the expectation that the community was committing to make something like that happen today.

[tylermjohn]

I think it could make sense in various instances to form a trade agreement between people earning and people doing direct work, where the latter group has additional control over how resources are spent.

It could also make sense to act like that trade agreement which was not in fact made was in fact made, if that incentivises people to do useful direct work.

But if this trade has never in fact transpired, explicitly or tacitly, I see no sense in which these resources “are meaningfully owned by the people who have forsaken direct control over that money in order to pursue our object-level priorities.”

[AndrewDoris]

Great comment. I think “people who sacrifice significantly higher salaries to do EA work” is a plausible minimum definition of who those calling for democratic reforms feel deserve a greater say in funding allocation. It doesn’t capture all of those people, nor solve the harder question of “what is EA work/​an EA organization?” But it’s a start.

Your ⁷⁰⁄₃₀ example made me wonder whether redesigning EA employee compensation packages to include large matching contributions might help as a democratizing force. Many employers outside EA/​in the private sector offer a matching contributions program, wherein they’ll match something like 1-5% of your salary (or up to a certain dollar value) in contributions to a certified nonprofit of your choosing. Maybe EA organizations (whichever voluntarily opt into this) could do that except much bigger—say, 20-50% of your overall compensation is paid not to you but to a charity of your choosing. This could also be tied to tenure so that the offered match increases at a faster rate than take home pay, reflecting the intuition that committed longtime members of the EA community have engaged with the ideas more, and potentially sacrificed more, and consequently deserve a stronger vote than newcomers.

Ex: Sarah’s total compensation is 100k, of which she takes home 80k and her employer offers an additional 20k to a charity of her choosing. After 2 years working there, her total package jumps to 120k, of which she takes home 88k and allocates another 32k. After 10 years she takes home 110 and allocates another 90, etc. This tenure could be interchangeable across participating organizations. With time, it may even resemble the “impact certificates” you mention.

Employers could limit this match to a prespecified list of plausibly EA recipients if they wish. Employees could accept this arrangement en lieu of giving X% of their personal incomes (which has the added benefit of avoiding taxation on “income” that’s only going to be given away to largely tax-deductible organizations anyway). Employees could also elect to give a certain amount back to their employing organization, which some presumably would since people tend to believe in the importance of work they are doing. We could write software to anonymize these donations, and avoid any fear of recrimination for NOT regifting it to the employing org.

One downside could be making it more expensive for EA organizations to hire, and thus harder for them to grow and harder for individual EAs to find an EA job. It also wouldn’t solve the fact that the resources controlled by EA organizations are not proportional to the number of people they employ, especially at the extremes. Perhaps if mega-donors like Dustin are open to democratization but wary of how to define the EA electorate, they’d support higher grants to participating recipients, on the logic that “if they’re EA enough to deserve my grant for X effective project, they’re EA enough to deserve a say in how some of my other money is spent too” (even beyond what they need for X).

For all I know EA organizations may have something like this already. If anyone has toyed with or tried to implement this idea before, I’d love to hear about it.

[MichaelStJules]

I think this is a proposal worth exploring. Open Phil could earmark additional funding to orgs for employee donation matching.

[MichaelStJules]

Another option would be to just directly give EA org employees regranting funds, with no need for them to donate their own money to regrant them. However, requiring some donation, maybe matching at a high rate, e.g. 5:1, gets them to take on at least some personal cost to direct funding.

Also, the EA org doesn’t need to touch the money. The org can just confirm employment, and the employee can regrant through a system Open Phil (or GWWC) sets up or report a donation for matching to Open Phil (or GWWC, with matching funds provided by Open Phil).

[Nick Whitaker]

Thank you for this. These are very interesting points. I have two (lightly held) qualms with this that I’m not sure obtain.

1. I suspect in the status quo, highly engaged, productive EAs who do work like yours do have a certain amount of influence over funding decisions. It certainly seems like most Future Fund regrantors fit into this pool. Obviously I don’t mean to imply everyone has the influence they deserve, but I do think this is meaningful when we consider the current state of EA vs a potential new system.

2. I worry this attitude also plays into some potentially harmful dynamics, where each EA feels like they have ownership over and responsibility for the entirety of EA. This may fuel things like a community organizer feeling the weight of every EA controversy on their own shoulders (I don’t know what was at play in that specific case) or an enthusiastic but naive 15 year old who feels that they deserve to make funding decisions because they have a forums account. Perhaps there could be some sort of demarcation between people who are actually making this trade with a willing counterparty(ies) from anyone who is currently working an EA job or otherwise associated.

Again, just the thoughts that came to mind, both tentative.

[jacquesthibs]

As an example: I specifically chose to start working on AI alignment rather than trying to build startups to try to fund EA because of SBF. I would probably be making a lot more money had I took a different route and would likely not have to deal with being in such a shaky, intense field where I’ve had to put parts of my life on hold for.

[Jeff Kaufman 🔸]

shaky, intense field where I’ve had to put parts of my life on hold for

That’s startups too, no?

[jacquesthibs]

Yeah, I agree. Though I feel I can imagine a lot of startups or businesses that require a lot of work, but don’t require as much brain power. I could have chosen a sector that doesn’t move as fast as AI (which has an endless stream of papers and posts to keep track of) and just requires me to build a useful product/​service for people. Being in a pre-paradigmatic field where things feel like they are moving insanely fast can feel overwhelming.

I don’t know, being in a field that I think feels much more high-risk and forces me to grapple with difficult concepts every day is exhausting. I could be wrong, but I doubt I’d feel this level of exhaustion if I built an ed-tech startup (while still difficult and the market is shaky).

(Actually, one of my first cash-grabs would have been to automate digital document stuff in government since I worked in it and have contacts. I don’t think I’d feel the same intensity and shaky-ness tackling something like that since that’s partially what I did when I was there. Part of my strategy was going to be to build something that can make me a couple million when I sell it, and then go after something bigger once I have some level of stability.)

Part of what I meant by “shaky-ness” is maybe that there’s a potential for higher monetary upside with startups and so if I end up successful, there’s a money safety net I can rely on (though there’s certainly a period of shaky-ness when you start). And building a business can basically be done anywhere while for alignment I might be ‘forced’ to head to a hub I don’t want to move to.

Then again, I could be making a bigger deal about alignment due to bias of being in the field.

[Holly Elmore ⏸️ 🔸]

I took OP to be talking about major donors with independent wealth (not earning to give or GWWC donations wealth) but I think this is a good point. It could be used to argue that the community should have had more control over SBF’s funds since he choose to focus on earning so he could contribute to EA that way.

[LukeDing]

I think the case of OP and SBF are very different.Alameda was set up with a lot of help from EA and expected to donate a lot if not most to EA causes. Whereas Dustin made his wealth without help from EA.

[Habryka]

I also think this applies somewhat to Open Phil, though it’s messy and I honestly feel confused a bit confused about it.

I do think that overall I would say that either Open Phil should pay at least something close to market rate for the labor in various priority areas (which for a chunk of people would be on the order of millions per year), or that they should give up some control over the money and take a stance towards the broader community that allows people with a strong track record of impact to direct funds relatively unilaterally.

In as much as neither of that happens, I would take that as substantial evidence that I would want more EAs to go into earning to give who would be happy to take that trade, and I would encourage people doing direct work to work less unless someone pays them a higher salary, though again, the details of the game theory here get messy really quickly, and I don’t have super strong answers.

[Nathan Young]

I think this is a really good point. Not sure I agree on the magnitude of the funds owned in this way but I think that it’s a good intuition.

[Jonathan Paulson]

This kind of deal makes sense, but IMO it would be better for it to be explicit than implicit, by actually transferring money to people with a lot of positive impact (maybe earmarked for charity), perhaps via higher salaries, or something like equity.

FWIW this loss of control over resources was a big negative factor when I last considered taking an EA job. It made me wonder whether the claims of high impact were just cheap talk (actually transferring control over money is a costly signal).

[NunoSempere]

FWIW, I think this might be reasonable to expect if OP was implementing FDT/​known to be implementing FDT. But they aren’t, and so I’d be very hesitant to rely/​expect on FDT-like promises (and indeed that is one factor which could push me towards making money rather than direct work), particularly since they aren’t enforceable.

[Habryka]

OpenPhil is pretty into decision theory stuff like this. I think some of them usually think more in EDT type thinking, but that checks out to the same here. I am pretty confident most of the OpenPhil longtermist team does not endorse CDT, and are quite open to considerations like this.

[Richard Y Chappell🔸]

Great post. I strongly agree with the core point.

Regarding the last section: it’d be an interesting experiment to add a “democratic” community-controlled fund to supplement the existing options. But I wouldn’t want to lose the existing EA funds, with their vetted expert grantmakers. I personally trust (and agree with) the “core EAs” more than the “concerned EAs”, and would be less inclined to donate to a fund where the latter group had more influence. But by all means, let a thousand flowers bloom—folks could then direct their donations to the fund that’s managed as they think best.

[ETA: Just saw that Jason has already made a similar point.]

[Andy Morgan 🔸]

Yeah, I strongly agree with this and wouldn’t continue to donate to the EA fund I currently donate to if it became “more democratic” rather than being directed by its vetted expert grantmakers. I’d be more than happy if a community-controlled fund was created, though.

To lend further support to the point that this post and your comment makes, making grantmaking “more democratic” through involving a group of concerned EAs seems analogous to making community housing decisions “more democratic” through community hall meetings. Those who attend community hall meetings aren’t a representative sample of the community but merely those who have time (and also tend to be those who have more to lose from community housing projects).

So its likely that not only would concerned EAs not be experts in a particular domain but would also be unrepresentative of the community as a whole.

[Jeff Kaufman 🔸]

it’d be an interesting experiment to add a “democratic” community-controlled fund to supplement the existing options

The idea seems intuitively appealing, an option for those who want to try it, see how it works. But I wonder whether the people who would fund this would actually prefer to participate in a donor lottery?

Curious to hear from anyone who would be excited to put their money a community-controlled fund.

[Jason]

I would probably donate a small amount, not because I think the EV would be higher, but because I assign some utility to the information value of seeing grant decisions by a truly independent set of decisionmakers. If there were consistent and significant differences from the grant portfolio of the usual expert decisionmakers, I would entertain the possibility that the usual decisionmakers had a blind spot (even though I would predict the probability as perhaps 25 percent, low confidence). If the democratic fund were small enough in comparison to the amount of expert-directed funding, and could be operated cheaply enough, losing a little EV would feel acceptable as a way to gain this information.

I think this year’s donor lottery is likely to go to the benefactor, especially the higher dollar amounts, so will produce zero information value.

[Jeroen De Ryck 🔹]

Thanks for writing this. On the one hand, I think these calls for democracy are caused by a lack of trust in EA orgs to spend the money as they see fit. On the other hand, that money comes from donors. If you don’t agree with a certain org or some actions of an org in the past, just don’t donate to them. (This sounds so obvious to me that I’m probably missing something.) Whether somebody else (who might happen to have a lot of money) agrees with you is their decision, as is where they allocate their money to.

In addition, EA is about “doing the most good”, not “doing what the majority believes to be the most good”, probably because the majority isn’t always right. I think it’s good that EA Funds are distributed in a technocratic way, rather than a democratic way, although I agree that more transparency would help people at least understand the decision processes behind granting decisions and allow for them to be criticized and improved.

[freedomandutility]

“If you don’t agree with a certain org or some actions of an org in the past, just don’t donate to them. (This sounds so obvious to me that I’m probably missing something.) Whether somebody else (who might happen to have a lot of money) agrees with you is their decision, as is where they allocate their money to.“

I think what you’re missing is that a significant aspect of EA has always (rightly) been trying to influence other people’s decisions on how they spend their money, and trying to make sure that their money is spent in a way that is more effective at improving the world.

When EA looks at the vast majority of Westeners only prioritising causes within their own countries, EA generally doesn’t say “that is your money so it’s your decision and we will not try to influence your decision, and we will just give our own money to a different cause”, it says “that is your money and it’s your decision, but we’re going to try to convince you to make a different decision based on our view of what is more effective at improving the world”.

I believe the “democratise EA funding decisions” critics are doing the same thing.

[Michael_PJ]

There’s a big difference between your two examples. EA has historically tried to influence people to use their money differently through persuasion: actually making an argument that they should use their money in a particular way and persuading them of it.

“Democratising funding decisions” instead gives direct power over decisions, regardless of argumentation. You don’t have to persuade people if you have a voting bloc that agrees with you.

And the old route is still there! If you think people should donate differently, then make this case. This might be a lot of work, but so be it. I think a good example of this is Michael Plant and HLI: they’ve put in serious work in making their case and they get taken seriously.

I don’t see why people are entitled to more power than that.

[Nick Whitaker]

I think it’s good that EA Funds are distributed in a technocratic way, rather than a democratic way, although I agree that more transparency would help people at least understand the decision processes behind granting decisions and allow for them to be criticized and improved.

I generally agree with this, though I don’t have a strong sense of how good EA Funds grants are. It just seems like a more reasonable grounds for debate than making demands of EA donors in general.

[calebp]

If the money for EA Funds comes from donors who have the impression the fund is allocated in a technocratic way do you still think it is a reasonable compromise for EA Funds to become more democratic? It seems low intergrity for an entity to raise funding after communicating a fairly specific model for how the funding will be used and then change it’s mind and spend it on a different program (unless we have made it pretty clear upfront that we might do other programs).

If the suggestion is to start a new fund that does not use existing donations that seems more reasonable to me, but then I don’t think that EA Funds has a substantial advantage in doing this over other organisations with similarly competent staff.

[Jason]

Agree on maintaining existing EA Funds largely as is, but I am curious what other non-EVF organizations might be in a good position to pull this off. I’m not a non-profit (or other) tax expert, but it seems that the number of non-EVF good homes for a new fund could be somewhat limited. In particular, my guess is that EVF/​CEA USA’s dual corporate existence in the US and UK is a major practical advantage. E.g., if the new funds only had a US corporate existence, they’d not only start off at a major disadvantage for UK donors, but would also face extra challenges granting to non-profits from the UK—presumably they would need to obtain an equivalency determination costing several thousand dollars, or assume expenditure responsibility, for each non-US non-profit grantee. And then you’d probably want some practical grantmaking-operations experience in the fiscal sponsor org as well for efficiency reasons.

[Nick Whitaker]

See here. I’m not sure how EA Funds is pitched to donors. A new fund probably would be better regardless.

(Adding for context: I had heard EA Funds was being reorganized at one point, which suggested to me it might be looking for a new funding model)

[Jason]

Of course, it is not impossible that the reformers could find significant donors who agree with their democratic grantmaking philosophy.

As far as EA Funds, I support empowering EAs by giving them options. You could give to the current funds (with some moderate reforms), or you could give to a fund in each cause area with strongly democratic processes. “I want to defer to expert fund managers rather than to a democratic process” is a valid donor preference, as is the converse.

[Michael_PJ]

Yes! If you want a democratic EA fund, why not start one? I’m pretty sure this would get funding from the EAIF. Generally, I think it’s a much healthier ecosystem when people compete by doing different things rather than by lobbying some “authoritative” party to get them to make changes.

[Jason]

If anyone is interested: it would be more efficient to house at least the back end of the new fund(s) somewhere in EVF for ops reasons, if all parties were willing. A democratic fund has some similarities to the donor lottery, which is housed in GWWC—so it doesn’t seem EVF has any theoretical objections to disbursing funds based on a non-EVF entity’s recommendations. I am predicting that the democratic fund(s) would be fairly small, at least at first, and that the need to duplicate back-end ops already present in the larger EA Funds would make them rather inefficient.

[lilly]

I am also skeptical of democratizing EA funding decisions because I share your concerns about effective implementation, but want to note that EA norms around this are somewhat out of step with norms around priority setting in other fields, particularly global health. In recent years, global health funders have taken steps to democratize funding decisions. For instance, the World Health Organization increasingly emphasizes the importance of fair decision-making processes; here’s a representative title: “Priority Setting for Universal Health Coverage: We Need Evidence-Informed Deliberative Processes, Not Just More Evidence on Cost-Effectiveness.”

Plausibly the increased emphasis on procedural approaches to priority setting is misguided, but there has been a decent amount of philosophical and empirical work on this. At a minimum, it seems like funders should engage with this literature before determining whether any of these approaches are worth considering.

[NickLaing]

Thanks Lilly, great points.

you’re right that EA is definitely moving away from the norms around priority setting in other fields, not just in global health but also in other global development field. I’ve noticed from my circulars I get from the Skoll foundation, that they seem to be moving away from brutal cost-effectiveness and towards inclusive and collaborative decision making.

Personally I prefer the EA norms at the moment, until I am convinced that being more democratic and collaborative is going to help the poorest people more. Here in Uganda, what might be touted as listening to “Public interest” in NGO circles often heavily favours the rich and government institutions, at the expense of the poorest people who realistically are not going to get a strong voice in any collaborative processes. This is sad but hard to rectify. For example in any NGO project I have seen from the outside or inside, if you try and democratise the project and ask “stakeholders” what money should be spent on, what ends up happening is far more “stakeholder meetings”, “trainings” and “conferences” which are basically euphemisms for “allowances for rich NGO workers and government officials”. In Uganda at least, it’s very hard for democratised aid to move far away from more rich and influential people feeding themselves through brutal self interest.

As a side note, a potental irony about the WHO is that in my limited experience they are remarkable inefficient and in practice may not be so concerned about cost-effectiveness, even though they talk that talk.

Anyway your point is am important point to remember, like you say that EA is moving further away from the norms of the mainstream development field.

[lilly]

Thanks for highlighting this!

My impression is also that the track record of so-called “fair processes” is really spotty for the reasons you note here—it’s hard to actually make them inclusive, they’re incredibly costly and burdensome, they often serve as a cover for NGOs/​multilaterals doing what they wanted to do anyways, etc.

I just think there is a more charitable case to be made for democratizing funding decisions than is made in this post, and also a much broader range of implementation strategies that could be considered. (I’m personally a fan of surveying potential beneficiaries on their priorities, as others have suggested.) I worry about EA becoming an echo chamber, so think it’s worth figuring out why multiple large fields (and, I think, most academics who work on these issues) have reached different conclusions than EA about this.

[Nick Whitaker]

Thanks for raising this. I haven’t been particularly persuaded by work in that vein but it’s certainly worth engaging with.

[Amber Dawn]

So I disagree with this post on the object level, but I more strongly object to...something about the tone, or the way in which you’re making this critique?

First, the title: ‘The EA community does not own its donors’ money’. idk—I bite the bullet and say that while the EA community of course does not legally own its donors’ money, the world at large does morally have claim to the wealth that, through accidents of history, happens to be pooled in the hands of a few. I legally own the money in my bank account, but I don’t feel like I have some deep moral right to it or something. Some of it comes from my family. Some of it does come from hard work… but there are lots of people who work really hard but are still poor because they happen to have been born in a poorer country, or lacked other opportunities that I had. That’s why I give away a lot of my money—I don’t think I have “claim” to all my money, just because it happens to be in my bank account.

Second, the headings: ‘How would this happen?’ and ‘Can you demand ten billion dollars?’ If someone has proposed a new way of doing things, it’s reasonable to ask for details. But the fact that details don’t already exist—at an early stage! - should not be grounds for critique. Compare:

”Can you demand that slave owners free their slaves?”
″What, are you just going to make people hire women for the same jobs as men?”

You are allowed to say ‘the world is suboptimal as it is; it would be better if it were different’ without having a detailed theory of change for how you get there! You can come up with that when you have more support for the broad proposal—many hands make light work!

[quinn]

I also don’t experience a moral conviction about my ownership of my bank account, but I understand there’s a lot of variance about this across the population and the differing intuitions here have caused society and history a great deal of stress. I guess I ascribe most of my success to birth lotteries and people who feel moreso like they had to grind and face adversity would be likely to feel like their ownership over their resources is a morally valid matter.

[Marcus Rademacher]

Thank you for given voice to this perspective. I’m frustrated it took this much scrolling through the comments to find someone who addressed the fairly odd framing the OP took.

I think it should really be turned on its head. Note I think much of this critique of EA is most relevant when talking about UHNW EAs. Can someone pledging to give away mass sums of money be trusted to do so if they’re unwilling to give up at least some significant control? We have now way to force them, but a there could be a new norm in EA which says they have to put a significant percentage of the pledge into a trust that’s partially controlled by other people before the community (and hopefully the press) gives them the social credit.

[tylermjohn]

Much as I am sympathetic to many of the points in this post, I don’t understand the purpose of the section, “Can you demand ten billion dollars?”. As I understand the proposal to democratise EA it’s just that: a proposal about what, morally, EA ought to do. It certainly doesn’t follow that any particular person or group should try to enforce that norm. So pointing out that it would be a bad idea to try to use force to establish this is not a meaningful criticism of the proposal.

[Nick Whitaker]

My apologies if this proves uncharitable. I interpreted Carla Zoe’s classification of this proposal as:

ideas I’m pretty sure about and thus believe we should now hire someone full time to work out different implementation options and implement one of them”)

as potentially endorsing grassroots attempts to democratize EA funding without funder buy-in. I do find the general ambiguity frustrating:

If you are going to make these proposals, please consider:

• Who you are actually asking to change their behavior?

• What actions you would be willing to take if they did not change their behavior?

But if no one interested in reform would endorse a strategy like this, it’s simply my mistake.

[freedomandutility]

Yes I think it’s uncharitable to assume that Carla means other people taking control of funds without funder buy in. I think the general hope with a lot of these posts is to convince funders too.

[𝕮𝖎𝖓𝖊𝖗𝖆]

Strongly upvoted.

I endorse basically everything here.

In general, I’m very unconvinced that raising EA bureaucracy and more democratically driven funding/​impact decisions would be net positive.

[Nick Whitaker]

I agree, creating an EA bureaucracy seems like the biggest problem lurking within these proposals

[sam_brenner]

I’ve wanted to write something similar myself, and you’ve done a great job with it! Thanks!

I feel that there’s an illusion of control that a lot of people have when it comes to imagining ways that EA could be different, and the parts of this post that I quote below do a good job of explaining how that control is so illusory.

EA is a genie out of its bottle, so to speak. There’s no way to guarantee that people won’t call themselves EAs or fund EA-like causes in the ways that they want rather than the way you might want them to. This is in part a huge strength, because it allows a lot of funding and interest, but it’s also a big weakness.

I feel this especially acutely when people lament how entangled EA was with SBF. It’s possible to imagine a version of EA that was less officially exuberant about him, but very hard imo to imagine a version that refuses to grant any influence whatsoever to a person who credibly promises billions of dollars of funding. Avoiding a situation like the FTX/​SBF one is hard not just because the central EA orgs can be swayed by funding but also, as the quotes below point out, because there will almost always be EAs who (rightly) will care more about their project getting funded than about complying with whatever regime of central control is created.

Say you can’t convince Moskovitz and OpenPhil leadership to turn over their funds to community deliberation.

You could try to create a cartel of EA organizations to refuse OpenPhil donations. This seems likely to fail—it would involve asking tens, perhaps hundreds, of people to risk their livelihoods. It would also be an incredibly poor way of managing the relationship between the community and its most generous funder—and very likely it would decrease the total number of donations to EA organizations and causes.

...

Let’s say a new donor did begin funding EA organizations, and didn’t want to abide by these rules. Perhaps they were just interested in donating to effective bio orgs. Would the community ask that all EA-associated organizations turn down their money? Obviously they shouldn’t—insofar as they are not otherwise unethical—organizations should accept money and use it to do as much good as possible. Rejecting a potential donor simply because they do not want to participate on a highly unusual funding system seems clearly wrong headed.

One analogy on my mind is that EA is fundamentally Protestant as opposed to Catholic when it comes to governance. (I think a lot of people make this analogy but not for governance). One of the defining features of Catholicism is submission to the Pope and church hierarchy. In Catholicism’s view, it is not enough to do and believe the right things on one’s own; instead one has to do them as part of the bigger institution. This is a matter insisted on by the Catholic Church, and nobody who wants to become or stay Catholic is surprised by it. As a result, Catholics have been strongly selected for being coordinated in their belief and action. By contrast, Protestants almost by definition do not share this view, and so nearly-universal coordination across them is rare, even when they share important fundamentals of belief.

The interesting feature that I have in mind is that, in this analogy, Catholicism’s success at coordination is limited only to those who submit to the coordination in the first place. Moreover, the insistence on coordination plays a big role in limiting broader coordination: many Protestants do not want to become Catholics precisely because it would mean giving up control and being coordinated.

Reading back to EA, I would predict from this analogy that coordination attempts won’t work very well, even among those who really believe in the importance of EA. Coordination attempts might dominate for centuries, like Catholicism did. But even in Catholicism’s case the coordination failed eventually despite the huge amount of effort and dogma that went into sustaining the belief in its authority. Even with an extremely motivated attempt at central coordination (and one that succeeded for centuries), many religious upstarts with wildly divergent beliefs are all able to call themselves Christian and act in the world and receive funding in the name of Christianity. My prediction is that EA will not be able to fare any better at preventing upstart Martin Luthers or Joseph Smiths or Sam Bankman-Frieds from doing all sorts of things in its name.

I do not mean to make any claim about whether EA should be more or less centrally controlled on the margin. The analogy does make it seem to me that a version of EA that would not accept SBF money would have to be centrally controlled to a nearly impossible degree.

[ChrisSmith]

Thanks for writing this Nick, I’m sympathetic and strongly upvoted (to declare a small COI, I work at Open Philanthropy). I will add two points which I don’t see as conflicting with your post but which hopefully complement it.

Firstly, if you’re reading this post you probably have “EA resources”.

You can donate your own money to organisations that you want to. While you can choose to donate to e.g. a CEA managed EA Fund (e.g. EA Infrastructure Fund, EA Animal Welfare Fund) or to a GiveWell managed fund, you can equally choose to donate ~wherever you want, including to individual charitable organisations. Extremely few of us have available financial resources within two orders of magnitude of Open Philanthropy’s core donors, but many of us are globally and historically rich.

It’s more difficult to do well, but many of you can donate your time, or partially donate your time through e.g. taking a lower salary to do direct work on pressing and important problems than your market value in another domain.

Secondly, and more personally, I just don’t think of most of my available resources as being deservedly “mine”. However badly my life goes, save civilizational catastrophe, I will not die because of lack of access to low-cost medication. I will not be slaughtered painfully and then processed into a chicken nugget, or a fish cake, or shrimp paste. My relative wealth is not deserved, and justice calls me to use it well to make the world better.

Warren Buffet’s giving pledge letter explores a similar theme:

My wealth has come from a combination of living in America, some lucky genes, and compound interest. Both my children and I won what I call the ovarian lottery. (For starters, the odds against my 1930 birth taking place in the U.S. were at least 30 to 1. My being male and white also removed huge obstacles that a majority of Americans then faced.)

My luck was accentuated by my living in a market system that sometimes produces distorted results, though overall it serves our country well. I’ve worked in an economy that rewards someone who saves the lives of others on a battlefield with a medal, rewards a great teacher with thank-you notes from parents, but rewards those who can detect the mispricing of securities with sums reaching into the billions. In short, fate’s distribution of long straws is wildly capricious.

The reaction of my family and me to our extraordinary good fortune is not guilt, but rather gratitude.Were we to use more than 1% of my claim checks on ourselves, neither our happiness nor our well-being would be enhanced. In contrast, that remaining 99% can have a huge effect on the health and welfare of others.

[Holly Elmore ⏸️ 🔸]

I nodded vigorously the entire time I read this post. Thank you.

[MatthewDahlhausen]

This post and headline conflate several issues:

1. Whether democratic control of resources will result in an efficient allocation towards doing the most good

2. Whether democratic control of resources will attract or deter contributions from wealthy people

3. Whether donors have a moral claim to their wealth

It seems many of the comments express agreement with 1) and 2), while ignoring 3).

I would hope that a majority of the EA community would agree that there aren’t good reasons for someone to claim ownership to billions of dollars. Perhaps there are those that disagree. If many disagree, in my mind that would mark a significant change in the EA community. See Derek Parfit’s comments on this to GWWC: http://​​www.youtube.com/​​watch?v=xTUrwO9-B_I&t=6m25s. The headline “The EA community does not own its donors’ money” may be true in a strictly legal sense, but the EA community, in that some of it prioritizes helping the worst off, has a much stronger moral claim to donors money than do the donors.

It’s entirely fair and reasonable to point out the practical difficulties and questionable efficiencies involved with implementing a democratic voting mechanism to allocate wealth. But I think it would be a mistake to further make some claim that major donors ought to be entitled to some significant control over how their money is spent. It’s worth keeping those ideas separate.

[Nick Whitaker]

I would hope that a majority of the EA community would agree that there aren’t good reasons for someone to claim ownership to billions of dollars. Perhaps there are those that disagree.

I would certainly disagree vehemently with this claim, and would hope the majority of EAs also disagree. I might clarify that this isn’t about arbitrarily claiming ownership of billions of dollars—it’s a question of whether you can earn billions of dollars through mutual exchange consistent with legal rules.

We might believe, as EAs, that it is either a duty or a supererogatory action to spend one’s money (especially as a billionaire) to do good, but this need not imply that one does not “own their money.”

(“EA community, in that some of it prioritizes helping the worst off, has a much stronger moral claim to donors money than do the donors” may also prove a bit too much in light of some recent events)

[kbog]

One good reason to claim ownership to billions of dollars is that you are going to donate billions of dollars to effective charities.

[Guy Raveh]

Meh. Depends how you got the money. Obviously SBF is an example of someone for whom it was definitely immoral, but I doubt a billionaire exists that actually made their money morally.

It’s also difficult sometimes to enforce pledges to donate the money—SBF kept most of his money rather than putting it in the non-profits. Though in this regard Moskovitz and Tuna (and also Gates and Buffett for example) have delivered.

[kbog]

I doubt a billionaire exists that actually made their money morally.

Why?

[Marcus Rademacher]

I can’t speak for Guy, but I’d say it’s because it’s impossible for a single person to create a billion dollars worth of value without skimming the vast majority of it from workers they employ.

[freedomandutility]

I think a significant part of the whole project of effective altruism has always been telling people how to spend money that we don’t own, so that the money is more effective at improving the world.

Seems reasonable to me for EAs to suggest ways of spending EA donor money that they think would be more effective at improving the world, including if they think that would be via giving more power to random EAs. Now whether that intervention would be more effective is a fair thing to debate.

As you touch on in the post, there are many weaker versions of some suggestions that could be experimented with at a a small scale, using EA Funds or some funding from Open Phil, and trying out a few different definitions of the ‘EA community’ - eg—EAG acceptance, Forum karma, etc, and using different voting models, eg—quadratic voting, one person one vote, uneven votes etc, veto power for Open Phil.

[peterhartree]

A number of recent proposals have detailed EA reforms. I have generally been unimpressed with these—they feel highly reactive and too tied to attractive sounding concepts (democratic, transparent, accountable) without well thought through mechanisms.

[...]

Why more democratic decision making would be better has gone largely unargued. To the extent it has been, “conflicts of interest” and “insularity” seem like marginal problems compared to basically having a deep understanding of the most important questions for the future/​global health and wellbeing.

Agree. Mood affiliation is not a reliable path to impact.

[freedomandutility]

“ But, as with other discourse, these proposals assume that because a foundation called Open Philanthropy is interested in the “EA Community” that the “EA Community” has/​deserves/​should be entitled to a say in how the foundation spends their money.”

I think the claim of entitlement here is both an uncharitable interpretation and irrelevant to the object level claim of “more democratic decision making would be more effective at improving the world”.

I think these proposals can be interpreted as “here is how EA could improve the long-term effectiveness of its spending”, in a similar way to how EA has spent years telling philanthropists “here is how you could improve the effectiveness of your spending”.

I don’t think it’s a good idea to pay too much attention to the difference in framing between “EA should do X” and “EA would be better at improving the world if it did X”.

[Stuart Buck]

Definitely agree with this post.

That said, I suspect that the underlying concern here is one of imbalance of power. As I’ve seen from the funder’s side, there are a number of downsides when a grantee is overly dependent on one particular funder: 1) the funder might change direction in a way that is devastating to the grantee and its employees; 2) the grantee is incentivized to cater solely to that one funder while remaining silent about possible criticisms, all of which can silently undermine the effectiveness of the work.

I wonder to what extent this happens to the EA movement broadly, given the dominance of Open Phil as a funder (more so due to the implosion of SBF).

To be sure, Open Phil does a better job than just about any philanthropy at being transparent and welcoming of critique!

Even so, folks are still intimidated (hence anonymity for that long “Doing EA Better” post), and it often strikes me that some possible lines of questioning aren’t raised at all.

For example, while I might have missed something, I haven’t seen anyone ask why the Regranting Challenge gave $70 million to the Gates Foundation that has a 2021 endowment of$55 billion, with Gates’ net worth over $100 billion and many more billions on the way from Warren Buffett.

Why is this cause “neglected”? It may well be, of course—perhaps the folks working on a TB vaccine are doing great work but don’t have the internal political capital at Gates to get even 1/​1000th of the Gates wealth allocated to their team. And it may just be a matter of framing—a “collaboration” or “joint funding effort” with Gates wouldn’t come across the same way as “a grant to Gates,” which I guess is irrational on my part. So maybe there’s nothing here at all.

Still....”giving money to Gates” is the kind of thing that would attract some questioning if anyone else did it, and the only criticism of the Regranting Challenge I’ve seen is from another funder who isn’t dependent on future funding here: https://​​twitter.com/​​mulagostarr/​​status/​​1613911821857230848

In other words, I suspect that some folks have the internal feeling, “I think Open Phil made questionable decisions in one case or another, but it seems too high-risk to speak out despite Open Phil’s willingness to consider critiques. I wish there were a way to capture the kinds of insights that are currently being stifled.”

The relative lack of truly honest feedback is something that bothered me as a funder, and it seemed really hard to address! Even anonymous surveys won’t tell you what grantees and others really think (most people that have a very specific insight or critique can’t say very much without making it obvious which grant they’re talking about and who is speaking).

[quinn]

I’ve been a part of one unfinished whitepaper and one unsubmitted grant application on mechanisms and platforms in this space, in particular they were interventions aimed at creating distributed epistemics which is I think a very slightly more technical way of describing the value prop of “democracy” without being as much of an applause light.

The unfinished whitepaper was a slightly convoluted grantmaking system driven by asset prices on a project market, based on the hypothesis that alleviating (epistemic) pressure from elite grantmakers would be good. You kind of need to believe as a premise that wisdom of crowds beats expertise, at least in some weakened form, which I don’t think is justified, so I dropped it.

The unsubmitted grant application was a play at getting more cost effectiveness analysis written as well as streamlining the process by which CEAs are consumed and donation decisions are produced. This isn’t as much of a direct democratization play as most of what’s discussed in this post, but it’s in the genre of alleviating the cognitive bottleneck from an elite few analysts and grantmakers. Nuño pointed out to me that even if this product would be a boon for donors of 2-5 zeroes, the large institutions probably wouldn’t use this to drive decisionmaking, (without users inside large institutions, the overall cost in developer hours probably doesn’t break even, since large institutions are more important measured in dollars than donors of 2-5 zeroes).

Again, I think the crux is the premise around the wisdom of crowds. And even if you don’t buy that crowds beat silo’d experts even in weakened form, you can still think that the cognitive pressure on a small number of movement leaders is problematic.

I’d like to thank Nuño, Eli Lifland, Nathan Young, Ashley Lin, Hazelfire, and David Reinstein for advancing the discussion with me and giving me some of the ideas in this comment (half of them encouraged me and half of them discouraged me, but I won’t tell you which is which).

[samuel]

I want to push back a bit on my own intuition, which is that trying to build out collective (or market-based) decision-making for EA funding is potentially impractical and/​or ineffective. Most EAs respect the power of the “wisdom of crowds”, and many advocate for prediction markets. Why exactly does this affinity for markets stop at funding? It sounds like most think collective decision-making for funding is not feasible enough to consider, and that’s 100% fair, but were it easy to implement, would it be ineffective?

Again, my intuition is to trust the subject matter experts, to rely on the institutions that we’ve built for this specific task. But I invest in index funds, I believe that past performance is no guarantee of future results, and I trust that aggregate markets are typically more accurate than most experts. Have EA organizations proved that they are essentially super-forecasters, that they consistently “beat the EA market” in terms of ROI? Perhaps this metaphor is doomed—these EA orgs are also market-makers as well. Who better to place bets than those with insider knowledge?

At the very least, this experiment seems ripe for running if it hasn’t been already. It’s far beyond me to figure out how to structure it, I’ll leave that to those like Nuno, who laid out a potential path. But we’re making a rather large assumption that the collective is by default ineffective.

EDIT: someone pointed out that I’m conflicting prediction markets w/​ collective decision making. I want to clarify that my comment is referring to market-based decision making (basically prediction markets), which I view as a subset of collective decision making. Maybe my EA vocab is off though.

[dan.pandori]

I think that this incorrectly conflates prediction markets and collective decision making.

(Prediction) markets are (theoretically) effective because folks that are able to reliably predict correctly will end up getting more money, and there are incentives in place for correct predictions to be made. It seems that the incentives for correct decision making are far weaker in collective decision making, and I don’t see any positive feedback loop where folks that are better at noticing impactful projects will get their opinions weighted more highly.

I think that if you put those feedback systems in place, it ends up rapidly looking much more like the situation as it is today than what most folks would call collective decision making.

[samuel]

Thanks for the feedback Dan. Maybe I’m using the vocabulary incorrectly—does collective specifically mean 1 person 1 vote? I do specifically avoid saying democratic and mention market-based decision making in the first sentence.

It’s not at all obvious to me that putting market-based feedback systems in place would look like the funding situation today. I think it’s worth pushing back on the assumption that EA’s current funding structure rewards the best performers in terms of asset allocation.

[dan.pandori]

Fair point! I was assuming that by collective decision making you meant much closer to 1 person 1 vote, but if it’s well defined term I’m not sure of the definition.

I haven’t heard much discussion on a market-based feedback system, and I’d be very interested in seeing it tried. Perhaps for legal or technical reasons it wouldn’t work out super well (similar to current prediction markets), but it seems well worth the experiment.

[Nathan Young]

Thanks for writing this, I’ve wanted to write something like this for a while, but could never frame it right.

I often think that rather than making decisions the community could have more scope to vet decisions in parallel and suggest changes. Eg if there was an automatic hidden forum post for every grant then you could comment there about that grant. Systems like this could allow information to build up before someone took it to the granted in question.

[Achim]

“Also—I’m using scare quotes here because I am very confused who these proposals mean when they say EA community. Is it a matter of having read certain books, or attending EAGs, hanging around for a certain amount of time, working at an org, donating a set amount of money, or being in the right Slacks?”

It is of course a relevant question who this community is supposed to consist of, but at the same time, this question could be asked whenever someone refers to the community as a collective agent doing something, having a certain opinion, benefitting from something etc. For example, you write “They may be interested in community input for their funding, via regranting for example, or invest in the Community”. If you can’t define the community, you cannot clearly say that someone invested in it. You later speak of “managing the relationship between the community and its most generous funder”, but it seems hard to say how this relationship is currently managed if the community is so hard to define.

[Will Payne]

I notice that you quoted:

The big funding bodies (OpenPhil, EA Funds, etc.) should be disaggregated into smaller independent funding bodies within 3 years

This feels like a totally seperate proposal right? Evaluated separately a world like ‘Someone who I trust about as much as I trust Holden or Alex (for independent reasons) is running an independent org which allocates funding’ seems pretty good. Specifically it seems more robust to ‘conflict-of-interest’ style concerns whilst keeping grant decisions in the hands of skilled grantmakers. (Maybe a smaller version of this proposal is splitting up Holden and Alex’s arms of OP although they seem independent enough that I’m not too bothered about this)

I think we could start talking about how feasible it is to construct an organisation like this and whether major funders like Holden would want to funnel money towards it but at the very least it hasn’t been ruled out by any of the reasoning above

[Arturo Macias]

I have written this post on the Effective Altruism governance and democratization.

https://​​forum.effectivealtruism.org/​​posts/​​KjahfX4vCbWWvgnf7/​​effective-altruism-governance-still-a-non-issue

I hope it helps to frame the issue.